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From the Myth of Babel to Google Translate: 
Confronting Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence—
Copyright and Algorithmic Biases in Online Translation 
Systems 
Professor Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid and Cynthia Martens* 
Many of us rely on Google Translate and other Artificial Intelligence 
and Machine Learning (AI) online translation daily for personal or 
commercial use. These AI systems have become ubiquitous and are poised 
to revolutionize human communication across the globe. Promising 
increased fluency across cultures by breaking down linguistic barriers and 
promoting cross-cultural relationships in a way that many civilizations 
have historically sought and struggled to achieve, AI translation affords 
users the means to turn any text—from phrases to books—into cognizable 
expression. 
This Article discusses the burgeoning possibilities in the 3A Era 
(Advanced, Autonomous, AI systems) of AI online translation as 
accessible tools, whose users are data suppliers and feedback providers, 
and hence, contributors to the programing and improvement processes of 
these translation tools. On the other hand, this Article also acknowledges 
the real concerns this new realm raises, stemming from malicious uses of 
AI, which are most often concealed from the public. Such hidden aspects 
include built-in algorithmic biases, such as race, sex and gender, color, 
religion, or national origin biases, which this Article addresses in a 
discussion of AI systems’ systemic shortcomings. Because AI translation 
systems learn and function through the data that they receive from data 
providers, they are vulnerable to societal biases. When users offer 
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feedback, these systems may perpetuate sexist, racist, or otherwise 
objectionable expressions, of which other users, when consulting the 
systems, are unaware. 
Furthermore, examining the current copyright regime, this Article 
claims, for the first time, that we, as users, have become inadvertent 
infringers of legal rights since a translation, according to copyright law, is 
a derivative work owned and controlled by the author. As such, an author’s 
permission is necessary prior to the creation of a translation, with the 
author in a position to collect payment when due. Moreover, under current 
law, the Fair Use Doctrine is frequently inapplicable. This Article claims 
that the legal and academic communities and policy makers have failed to 
address AI translation systems within the copyright regime, and that this 
failure renders the current copyright regime outdated and ill-equipped to 
handle the advent of sophisticated AI tools. Additionally, this Article 
states that the present inability of AI technology to routinely capture the 
nuance of human prose gives rise to another concern. The ubiquitous role 
such (as yet) flawed AI online translation systems play in translation 
services, for personal or commercial purposes, should be better balanced 
with the concerns of authors—who may worry about the linguistic 
integrity of an AI translation of their work—and their rights, in certain 
circumstances, to control translations of their work and object to 
unauthorized AI translations. 
Understanding the concerns attending unauthorized AI translations 
under the current copyright regime, while still recognizing that users 
should be able to profit from the wellspring of literacy which AI 
translation offers, this Article argues for a harmonization of AI translation 
with amended copyright protection. 
To that end, this Article calls on policymakers to adjust the current 
legal regime to include advanced technologies and suggests new principles 
for combining legal tools with existing technology. Such an approach 
would better balance the benefits of accessible AI translation systems with 
the requirements of a modified, modern copyright regime via the 
implementation of a method coined “fair use and equality by design.” 
Additionally, by recognizing the conflicting interests at stake, this Article 
invites international policymakers, such as WIPO (the World Intellectual 
Property Organization), to promote the development of international 
standardized guidelines for the use of AI translation systems, and possibly 
other AI systems, by emphasizing fair use exemptions and limitations. 
This Article concludes that by understanding the significant 
drawbacks of AI translation systems and adopting the suggested 
principles, policymakers can promote access to an evolving AI 
technology, while also recognizing the integrity of authors’ linguistic 
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choices and preserving the beauty of linguistic diversity—which, as the 
ancient story of Babel hinted, is valuable because of, not despite, the 
challenges it poses. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Linguistic barriers have frustrated people for thousands of years. In 
the famous story of the Tower of Babel, Genesis 11:1–9 describes how 
“the whole earth had one language and the same words” until its denizens 
sought to build “a tower with its top in the heavens,” and God intervened 
to curtail this excessive ambition, saying, “Come, let us go down, and 
confuse their language there, so that they will not understand one another’s 
speech.”1 From then on, according to biblical history, the world’s 
inhabitants were scattered across the globe, unable to understand each 
other’s languages.2 Recently, however, Google Translate and other web-
based AI translation systems have disrupted this narrative by allowing 
people to quickly access translations online.3 
Though it can be tempting to think translations require no more than 
replacing a word in one language with the corresponding word in another, 
                                                     
 1. 7 Genesis 11:1–9 (New Revised Standard Version).  
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally Gideon Lewis-Kraus, Is Translation an Art or a Math Problem?, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/is-translation-an-art-or-a-math-
problem.html [https://perma.cc/X8EC-DTPM]. 
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this has never been true.4 Translations are as powerful and complex as the 
languages and the advanced technology that produce them.5 
In 2006, Google launched its online Google Translate service. Since 
then, this tool has become ubiquitous, as users easily and frequently turn 
to the world’s dominant search engine to translate everything from quick 
phrases to lengthy texts.6 Though the benefits and convenience of Google 
Translate and other similar programs are obvious, their use has caused 
large swathes of the global population to become inadvertent infringers of 
copyright law because legally authors, and not users or search engines, 
have the exclusive right to control translations of their works. Even the 
American Fair Use Doctrine does not present a consistently good defense 
to this use of corporate translation platforms, which do not limit the 
amount of works users can borrow. What is more, because such platforms 
make money off of users’ translation queries, their use of the original 
works is commercial and possibly supplants the market for an authorized 
translation. 
The question then becomes whether the traditional copyright regime 
can meet the challenges of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
(AI) online translation systems,7 or whether this regime is outdated and in 
                                                     
 4. See Cassandra L. McKeown & Michael G. Miller, Say What?: South Dakota’s Unsettling 
Indifference to Linguistic Minorities in the Courtroom, 54 S.D. L. REV. 33, 41–42 (2009) 
(“Historically, courts have embraced the ‘conduit theory’ of interpretation. This theory views the 
interpreter as a machine into which one language enters and another language exits . . . . Regardless 
of the cause, the bench and bar regularly underestimate the difficulty of facilitating accurate 
communication between languages and cultures.”); see also Stella Szantova Giordano, Note, It’s All 
Greek to Me: Are Attorneys Who Engage in or Procure Legal Translation for Their Clients at Risk of 
Committing an Ethical Violation?, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 447, 448 (2013) (“While the legal 
community often assumes that legal translation is merely a simple and straightforward mechanical 
process, akin to an administrative function, linguists and comparative lawyers vehemently disagree. 
Any type of foreign language translation is an inherently imperfect and imprecise process.”). 
 5. See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. (“Google Translate is far and away the venture that has done the most to realize the old 
science-fiction dream of serene, unrippled exchange. The search giant has made ubiquitous those little 
buttons, in email and on websites, that deliver instantaneous conversion between language pairs. 
Google says the service is used more than a billion times a day worldwide, by more than 500 million 
people a month.”). 
 7. In this Article, we will use the phrases AI and ML interchangeably to refer to online translation 
programs. See Debora Person, AI Application in the Practice of Law, WYO. LAW., Aug. 2017, at 50 
(“Artificial intelligence is an umbrella term. It refers to natural language processing and machine 
learning functions.”). For a discussion of artificial intelligence systems in general and the intellectual 
property regime, see Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, 
Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Workers Are Already Here—A New 
Model, 4 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659 (2017) [hereinafter Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt] 
(discussing artificial intelligence systems that produce works of art and suggesting that the work-for-
hire doctrine would allow for imposing accountability and ownership on the user); see also Shlomit 
Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: 
An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3a Era, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2223–24 (2018) 
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need of amendment or replacement. Copyright is not, however, the only 
issue web translation tools raise. Because online translation tools 
predominantly rely on AI, their end products are vulnerable to algorithmic 
biases users are often unaware of; widespread reliance on incorrect 
translations can perpetuate discrimination, facilitate rights violations, and 
lead users to communicate with prejudiced or inappropriate terminology.8 
AI online translation tools are by far among the most accessible and 
user-friendly of AI systems, translating with just a few clicks of a mouse 
or taps on a smartphone screen. As advanced technology tools have 
developed rapidly, AI translation systems have also become available on 
newer devices, including, reportedly, Amazon’s virtual assistant Alexa 
and Apple’s well-known Siri.9 Popular AI translation tools such as Google 
Translate, Microsoft Translator, DeepL or Systran, among many other 
options, transfer written materials including emails, advertisements, news, 
articles, songs, literature, books, and lectures from one language into 
another. These tools create derivative works by translating copyrighted 
written materials with just a quick click.10 In many ways, by eliminating 
linguistic hurdles and enabling international communication, this 
advanced technology revives questions at the heart of the Biblical story of 
the Tower of Babel. 
Interpretations of the story of Babel are varied. What was it about the 
building of the tower that warranted divine interference? Why did God’s 
intervention consist of sowing such widespread linguistic confusion? 
Theories abound: some suggest that God was distressed by the dangerous 
potential for people using “the same words” to exhibit a uniformity of 
thought, rather than promoting diversity, which is beneficiary to the 
growth and the development of humankind.11 Others argue that the tower 
                                                     
(describing the use of AI systems to produce creative works and the applicability of intellectual 
property laws, which in some ways have become irrelevant and outdated, with a focus on patent law). 
 8. See infra note 146. 
 9. See, e.g., Dave Gershgorn, Cultural Context Is the Hardest Part of Speaking a Foreign 
Language. Amazon’s Alexa Could Change That, QUARTZ (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://qz.com/1219383/amazon-alexas-language-translation-ai-will-reportedly-learn-cultural-
context [https://perma.cc/BS5Y-SYF5] (citing a report from Yahoo Finance suggesting that Amazon 
“is looking to amp up Alexa’s translation skills, by also including how to respond to cultural norms”). 
 10. See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 3. 
 11. Shai Held, The Babel Story is About the Dangers of Uniformity, CHRISTIAN CENTURY (Oct. 
24, 2017), https://www.christiancentury.org/article/critical-essay/the-babel-story-is-about-dangers-
uniformity [https://perma.cc/PT29-U72G]; see also YESHAYAHU LEIBOWITZ, SEVEN YEARS OF 
CONVERSATIONS OVER THE WEEKLY TORAH PORTION 1976–1982, at 30–35 (Ben Zion Mishael 
Nuriel ed., 2000); Andrea Cantor, Babel: The Biblical Imperative for Diversity, JEWISH EXPONENT 
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://jewishexponent.com/2013/04/18/babel-the-biblical-imperative-for-diversity 
[https://perma.cc/F9UX-U9FM]. 
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symbolized mankind’s “arrogant pursuit of fame and power.”12 It is also 
true that humanity gained tremendously from the emergence of different 
languages and dialects, each of which is connected to a particular place 
and culture. Nevertheless, to the popular imagination, Babel, a mysterious 
story “among the most famous in the Bible,”13 often represents a tragic 
loss of communication among people—a barrier and source of 
divisiveness.14 Perhaps this loss explains the impassioned promotion of AI 
online translation systems as revolutionary tools poised to return the world 
to a pre-Babel era by creating an online bridge across languages—one that 
enhances communication and supports peace.15 On the other hand, in 
addition to transforming virtually all users into unwitting copyright 
infringers, these systems can also produce inaccurate and biased 
translations that reflect poorly on their creators and users alike, not to 
mention the original authors whose works new readers encounter for the 
first time in translated form. 
This Article, therefore, discusses the challenges that AI translation 
tools pose to users, authors, and copyright law. As these systems have 
become omnipresent, insufficient attention has been paid to the copyright 
regime, to the need to incentivize authors while promoting the public 
welfare, to the importance of accurate translations, and to the right of 
authors to object to adulteration of their works. This Article argues that in 
the “3A era” (namely, that of Advanced, Automatic, and Autonomous AI 
systems), intellectual property policymakers should specifically address 
online translation to eliminate legal confusion and better balance 
conflicting needs. The interests at stake include those of the public, which 
benefits from easily accessible translation tools, of authors, who have the 
right to control the use of their works, and of technology firms, which 
currently profit from free access to both user data and author material. 
Since translation consists of converting one language to another, and since 
the use of AI translation systems has reached global proportions, so, too, 
are the legal challenges these systems pose in a global scope. A 
comparative legal awareness and analysis are therefore necessary to 
develop a unified solution reflective of differences in national regulation. 
                                                     
 12. Jan Christian Gertz, The Tower of Babel (Gen 11:1–9), BIBLE ODYSSEY (Feb. 7, 2019), 
http://www.bibleodyssey.com/passages/main-articles/tower-of-babel [https://perma.cc/J26R-C624]. 
 13. Brent A. Strawn, Holes in the Tower of Babel, OXFORD BIBLICAL STUD. ONLINE, 
https://global.oup.com/obso/focus/focus_on_towerbabel (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). 
 14. See Lewis-Kraus, supra note 3 (“It is a dream that harks back to Genesis, of a common 
tongue that perfectly maps thought to world. In Scripture, this allowed for a humanity so well 
coordinated, so alike in its understanding, that all the world’s subcontractors could agree on a time to 
build a tower to the heavens. Since Babel, though, even the smallest construction projects are plagued 
by terrible delays.”). 
 15. Id. 
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Although many of the materials being translated online are 
copyrightable assets, users of AI translation tools do not generally contact 
rightsholders for permission, and thus have neither obtained licenses to 
use the works nor paid royalties for them. As a result, on an everyday basis 
many are violating copyright law. This Article assumes that a majority of 
users are not aware of the legal protections afforded to translations. 
Translation is explicitly defined in the Copyright Act as a derivative work, 
whose copyrights belongs to the author (or to an author-approved person 
or entity).16 We argue that these routine infringements further weaken the 
validity and influence of copyright, which has been damaged by a 
libertarian internet philosophy that totally ignores authorship and 
accuracy.17 While undoubtedly many applications of AI translation 
constitute fair use by individual internet users, it is unclear why wealthy 
technology companies such as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft should 
have free access to authors’ derivative rights. Copyright is a balancing act 
that aims to protect free expression and serve the public welfare by 
providing creative individuals with limited-time incentives to share the 
fruits of their labor. By ignoring the conflicts of AI translation, lawmakers 
are spreading confusion—which is only likely to grow as AI develops 
further—and undermining copyright law, which becomes meaningless if 
not enforced. 
We acknowledge that our arguments raise conflict between 
traditional copyright protections and the benefits of advanced 
technology—one which no one wants to confront, despite the fact that 
most users are technically violating current copyright law when they 
engage with Google Translate. However, we do not advocate for the 
elimination of AI translation tools, or for an overly expansive version of 
copyright law. Instead, we argue that the law must better reconcile the 
interests of the different stakeholders in order for the “Progress of Science 
and useful Arts”18 to flourish for the benefit of all. We call for a re-thinking 
of copyright laws that stresses the importance of both AI translation tools 
and copyright ideals by implementing principles of proportionality and 
reasonableness. Given the inherently international nature of the internet 
                                                     
 16. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2018). “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).  
 17. See, e.g., 63 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (2001) (discussing copyright infringement by 
file sharing on the internet). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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and translation, we posit that the best solution will involve input from 
comparative and international lawmakers. 
This Article both recognizes the value of AI translation systems and 
questions their unfettered use, which—as stressed—leads to copyright 
violations and unreliable, potentially biased language. Following the 
discussion of this state of affairs and its attendant concerns, we make 
several recommendations. First, a combination of digital and legal tools 
should balance the competing interests at stake. Second, a new AI 
translation system paradigm requires greater consideration for authors’ 
rights in translations of their works; however, it should not sacrifice the 
important goal of facilitating cross-cultural exchange online. Thus, 
policymakers should allow free use of AI translation programs, while 
limiting the amount and type of content that may be translated 
automatically online in conjunction with software designers building AI 
translation platforms to reflect these constraints; in other words, programs 
should respect copyright by adopting a fair use design. Lawmakers should 
also require AI translation services to allow authors to opt out of having 
their webpages translated automatically. Third, policymakers should 
publish norms and guidelines clarifying the extent to which the Fair Use 
Doctrine covers AI online translation services and when infringements of 
the law occur. The industry should then update its practices to adhere to 
the rules. Fourth, given the internet’s intrinsically global reach, and given 
that AI translation programs raise copyright concerns in many 
jurisdictions, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) should 
develop guidelines for these programs’ use. United States lawmakers 
should closely examine the ways in which various jurisdictions have 
addressed conflicts between new technology online and copyright law and 
consider how to involve the international community in a workable 
solution. This framework will close the current gap in the enforcement of 
copyright law and better preserve the balanced interests the law has long 
sought to achieve. 
These proposals are based on the well-established need to align the 
general public’s right to access knowledge and the arts with the rights of 
authors to profit from their original creative endeavors for a limited time.19 
Careful calibration of these rights is crucial. Insufficient protection of 
authors discourages them from publishing their works, thus creating a loss 
                                                     
 19. Id. 
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for global society.20 However, unlimited copyright protection of original 
works may stymie technological progress.21 
Finally, this paper challenges an underlying premise popular among 
those who argue wholesale against any enforcement of copyright 
limitations on automated translation programs: namely, that linguistic 
variation is an unnecessary encumbrance that should be vanquished 
whenever and however possible. While translations play an important role 
in communicating and sharing knowledge, culture, and experience, the 
success and value of translations hinge on a cultural sensitivity that 
machines still lack.22 We argue that making translations widely accessible 
without paying attention to the quality of the language that actually 
conveys the information within the underlying text not only infringes on 
authors’ rights, but also ignores the beautiful complexity of human 
language—far from being a problem, such complexity merits celebration. 
In summary, the first Part of this Article traces the controversial 
history of translation and discusses the elements of good translations. The 
second Part examines the mechanics of AI translation systems and their 
ability to learn as they accumulate data, which users increasingly 
contribute, as well as the limitations of AI translation. The third Part 
addresses the ways in which AI translations may be biased. The fourth Part 
explores how the Derivative Works Doctrine has been applied to 
translations done by humans and considers the implications of classifying 
AI translations as derivative works. The fifth Part re-examines copyright 
law and its theoretical justifications in both the United States and other 
jurisdictions and challenges lawmakers to better regulate the use of AI 
translation systems to protect the interests of various stakeholders. The 
final Part posits the need for new legal and digital tools to address the 
copyright problems posed by AI translation online. 
                                                     
 20. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 483, 485 (1996) (“[D]efining the appropriate scope of copyright has entailed an examination of 
incentives and access. Broadening the scope of copyright increases the incentive to produce works of 
authorship and results in a greater variety of such works. Broadening copyright’s scope, however, also 
limits access to such works both generally, by increasing their price, and specifically, by limiting the 
material that others can use to create additional works. Given these competing considerations, defining 
copyright’s proper scope has become a matter of balancing the benefits of broader protection, in the 
form of increased incentive to produce such works, against its costs, in the form of lost access to such 
works.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See infra notes 67–71. 
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II. TRANSLATION IN PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE BIBLE TO GOOGLE 
TRANSLATE 
Translation has a long and contentious history. As translator David 
Bellos remarked, “War, diplomacy, trade, and exploration are activities 
where trust is both crucial and difficult to grant . . . [i]f you don’t know the 
language of your enemy or your partner, you depend entirely on people 
who do—and there’s nothing like dependency to foster resentment and 
fear.”23 The perception of translation as a tool to build bridges between 
cultures has never been universally adopted. Taking a historical view 
allows us to consider just how heated fights over the legitimacy of 
translation have been. 
A. The Controversial History of Translation 
The Bible is among the most read, sold, and translated books in the 
history of the world.24 It is also among the most controversial, with 
suspicion running rampant among believers who fear that the translations 
and interpretations of opposing sects aim to undermine the true faith.25 
Yet, “much of the Western theory and practice of translation stems 
immediately from the need to disseminate the Gospels.”26 
As the printing press made it easier to share written knowledge in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, tensions arose between European 
Catholics and members of the Protestant Reformation.27 William Tyndale, 
the first man to produce a complete English version of the Bible in print, 
was strangled and burned at the stake in 1536 for a translation that 
challenged the Roman Catholic Church.28 The same year, Jacob van 
Liesveldt, who translated the first Dutch Bible, was beheaded.29 Centuries 
later, during the Philadelphia Bible Riots, violence erupted between 
                                                     
 23. DAVID BELLOS, IS THAT A FISH IN YOUR EAR?, at 117 (2011). 
 24. Best-Selling Book of Non-Fiction, GUINNESS WORLD RECS., http://www.guinness 
worldrecords.com/world-records/best-selling-book-of-non-fiction [https://perma.cc/HJ5L-R56S] 
(“Although it is impossible to obtain exact figures, there is little doubt that the Bible is the world’s 
best-selling and most widely distributed book.”). 
 25. See, e.g., HARRY FREEDMAN, THE MURDEROUS HISTORY OF BIBLE TRANSLATIONS: POWER, 
CONFLICT, AND THE QUEST FOR MEANING 14 (1st ed. 2016) (“Although both the Jewish and Christian 
sources affirmed the miraculous nature of the translation, they did so for very different reasons. 
Irenaeus had said that it was so the Jewish translators couldn’t collude and falsify the Bible. The Jewish 
sources claimed it was to eliminate the possibility of people reading ideas into the Hebrew text that 
weren’t there.”). 
 26. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE & TRANSLATION 257 (3d ed. 
1998). 
 27. See Stanislav Getmanenko, Freedom from the Press: Why the Federal Propaganda 
Prohibition Act of 2005 Is A Good Idea, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 251, 258–59 n.38 (2009) (“The printing 
press was the ‘catalyst for Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance, and the Industrial Revolution.’”). 
 28. FREEDMAN, supra note 25, at 1, 112. 
 29. Id. 
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“nativist” Protestants and the local Catholic community following a 
bishop’s request that Catholic children be allowed to read the Douay-
Reims translation of the Bible at school.30 
Oral translation (i.e., interpretation) has also long played an 
important role in world affairs.31 Between the fifteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the Ottoman Empire relied on young men trained in Western 
languages, such as Italian—many of them from Greek-speaking, Roman 
Catholic communities—to assist in primarily oral, multilingual 
diplomacy.32 When these young men needed to prepare written 
translations of matters at hand, they followed their usual practices for oral 
interpretation, altering the Turkish pasha’s language to a form best suited 
to achieving his diplomatic goals; the stakes were high, as disloyalty was 
punishable by death.33 In 1821, in fact, a Grand Dragoman named Stavraki 
Aristarchi was hanged for treason after Greek provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire revolted: the pasha, it seems, could not trust the translators.34 
In his memoir Translating History, Igor Korchilov recounted his 
years spent as a Russian-English conference interpreter who worked 
extensively with the United Nations and Soviet leaders, such as Mikhail 
Gorbachev, during the Cold War.35 According to Korchilov, a fundamental 
quality for interpreters is “what in Russian is called perevoploscheniye, or 
the ability to put oneself in the speaker’s shoes, to become his 
döppelganger, as it were, to catch the essence of his message and not 
simply repeat what he is saying in another language.”36 Yet, interpreters 
also face immense pressure when their interlocutors are negotiating 
nuclear peace and national security; Korchilov describes one Russian 
interpreter who, while interpreting a speech by Ronald Reagan for 
Gorbachev and other Russian leaders in 1987 in Washington, D.C., 
translated the word adversaries in the phrase, “a coming together not of 
allies, but of adversaries,” as “competitors.”37 Not unlike the Turkish 
interpreters from centuries past, this interpreter was “[o]bviously aware of 
the potential fallout the direct translation of the word would have had on 
the Soviet audience” at a time when all were seeking to end the Cold 
War.38 
                                                     
 30. See generally Amanda Beyer-Purvis, The Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1844: Contest Over 
the Rights of Citizens, 83 PA. HIST. 366 (2016) (discussing the causes and context of the Philadelphia 
Bible Riots). 
 31. See BELLOS, supra note 23, at 121. 
 32. Id. at 122–25. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 127. 
 35. IGOR KORCHILOV, TRANSLATING HISTORY (1997). 
 36. Id. at 21. 
 37. Id. at 65. 
 38. Id. 
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Translation disputes persist today. In 2017, The New York Times 
Magazine published a lengthy article about a new English translation of 
the Odyssey by classicist Emily Wilson, in which she explained her 
controversial choice of the word “complicated” for the ancient Greek 
polytropos in the story’s famed opening lines, where other translators had 
used more elaborate, if no less uniform, phrases such as “for wisdom’s 
various arts renown’d,” “of wide-ranging spirit,” and “so wary and 
wise.”39 The political nature of translations also received attention when 
United States President Donald Trump gave a speech before the United 
Nations General Assembly, and an Iranian interpreter took significant 
liberties in his rendition of the remarks in Farsi.40 
The Wycliffe Global Alliance, which aims to make the Bible 
accessible to as many people as possible in as many languages as required, 
notes that translation: 
is more than finding out what the biblical text says and saying it in 
the other language. Translation is a process of discovering what was 
understood in the original setting and discerning the degree to which 
readers or hearers in the new context will be able to arrive at a similar 
understanding.41 
Translating, therefore, is not—and never has been—a neutral activity; how 
a concept is converted from one language to another shapes reader or lis-
tener perceptions and may serve political ends. 
B. Language Barriers and Copyright 
The Babel story’s sense of awe and frustration with language barriers 
does not stand alone. In the late nineteenth century, well before the 
existence of online AI translation (or virtually any automated translation), 
a Polish physician named Ludwig L. Zamenhof introduced Esperanto to 
                                                     
 39. Wyatt Mason, The First Woman to Translate the ‘Odyssey’ Into English, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Nov. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2iTUP84 [https://perma.cc/7D7Y-5P2E]. The journalist who 
interviewed Wilson observed, “You might be inclined to suppose that, over the course of nearly half 
a millennium, we must have reached a consensus on the English equivalent for an old Greek word, 
polytropos. But to consult Wilson’s 60 some predecessors, living and dead, is to find that consensus 
has been hard to come by.” Id. 
 40. Chris Bell et al., Iranian Interpreter Defends Trump Speech Omissions, BBC (Sept. 21, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41347217 [https://perma.cc/Q79B-2B8X]. In 
this case, “[The Islamic Republic of Iran] has turned a wealthy country, with a rich history and culture, 
into an economically depleted rogue state whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed and chaos” was 
translated to “[i]n our opinion, the life of Iranians could be better.” Id. 
 41. Bible Translation Statistics – Frequently Asked Questions, WYCLIFFE GLOBAL ALLIANCE 
(Nov. 2013), http://resources.wycliffe.net/statistics/2013/WycliffeGA_stats_FAQs_EN.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7QHC-T5CJ]. 
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the world.42 Zamenhof hoped that Esperanto, an artificial language that 
drew heavily from Romance languages, would promote greater 
intercultural understanding.43 Though the name “Esperanto” is derived 
from the Latin root for “hope,” the language never flourished.44 Today, 
Google Translate has taken up the torch by encouraging users to “[s]peak 
with the world.”45 Meanwhile, Microsoft Translator recently included 
Tamil in its repertoire in an effort to “help[] break the language barrier of 
communication worldwide and within the Indian subcontinent itself.”46 
Writing about the copyright issues of online translation systems over 
a decade ago, Erik Ketzan argued that these systems “increase social 
interaction across cultures and languages, possibly dramatically.”47 
Therefore, he maintained that such programs should be legally non-
infringing, or at least facilitated by the creation of effective licenses, noting 
that “[i]t is easy to imagine a future in which we seamlessly surf the 
entirety of the internet in our native language, with occasional (or 
frequent) linguistic mistakes being the only indication that we are reading 
machine-translated text.”48 We agree that AI translation systems have 
great potential. They can facilitate international communication in some 
settings and perhaps limit the human tendency to demonize others.49 
Accessible AI translation systems can also help people forge economically 
beneficial partnerships and collaborations. From a social perspective, 
accessible translation systems can be highly valuable tools, especially in 
the present globalized era, in which many people work for international 
                                                     
 42. Olivia B. Waxman, The Serious History Behind Esperanto, TIME (July 26, 2016), 
http://time.com/4417809/esperanto-history-invention [https://perma.cc/4GTZ-KU2W] (“[A] wave of 
anti-Semitism underscored Zamenhof’s thinking that the world needed a single language that would 
make it possible for people to bridge gaps of religion or ethnicity.”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. About, GOOGLE TRANSLATE, https://translate.google.com/intl/en/about [https://perma. 
cc/8NGE-KZJG]. 
 46. Microsoft Translator, Microsoft Translator Adds Tamil as a Supported Language, 
MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT TRANSLATOR BLOG (Oct. 24, 2017), https://blogs.msdn.microsoft 
.com/translation/2017/10/24/microsoft-translator-adds-tamil [https://perma.cc/XA25-PU7R]. 
 47. Erik Ketzan, Rebuilding Babel: Copyright and the Future of Online Machine Translation, 9 
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 205, 218 (2007). 
 48. Id.  
 49. TORGEIR M. HILLESTAD, U. STAVANGER, THE METAPSYCHOLOGY OF EVIL: MAIN 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND CRITIQUE 43 (2014), https://brage. 
bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/274771/Rapport_47.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/B3 
SW-44M8]. “In fact, a main function of the group itself is often to build up a barrier between the 
‘good-us’ and the ‘bad-others’ . . . . We systematically strip the ‘others’, the opposition, of any human 
qualities for which we might have empathy or compassion. The ‘others’ are thus demonized as the 
very embodiment of evil.” Id. 
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companies outside their home country.50 Our wide-scale multilingual 
sharing of information is unprecedented and has no doubt exposed people 
to material they might otherwise never have encountered.51 
However, unlike Ketzan, we believe that AI translation systems’ 
complete eschewing of copyright law is just one of their significant, 
though infrequently discussed, drawbacks. Rather than blindly favoring 
technology over all other rights, we argue that the intellectual property 
framework requires a new model to address the competing interests at 
stake. More than a decade after Ketzan published his piece, there is still a 
huge legal vacuum in this field. Users routinely violate the intellectual 
property rights of third parties when they engage with AI online translation 
systems to transfer, for example, full webpages from one language to 
another, while also freely giving away their data to for-profit corporations 
in the process, with no real understanding of how companies use that data 
and how long it is stored. Privacy concerns aside, the continued 
inaccuracies of AI translation are also problematic, both for authors—
whose works the process of translation may deform—and for users, who 
may unwittingly make offensive statements stemming from algorithmic 
bias. Human language and intercultural communication, it seems, do not 
easily fit into the tidy compartments of AI translation. 
Additionally, as Ketzan acknowledges, by reducing the world’s 
wealth of languages to a single, off-key tongue, AI translation systems 
may discourage users from experiencing “foreign travel, music, and 
literature in the original language”52 to the detriment of collective diversity 
and inner enrichment, as culture is strongly intertwined with language.53 
Essentially, although linguistic differences may frustrate us, they also 
foster innovation and allow societies around the world to find unique 
cultural expression. In our enthusiastic embrace of new technologies, we 
should not lose sight of the value of difference, even when it poses 
challenges. 
                                                     
 50. See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, A Lifeline Not Made in the U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/business/18excerpt.html [https://perma.cc/U7EB-8KFU] 
(discussing the “millions of Americans” who work for foreign companies operating in the United 
States). 
 51. See Margot E. Kaminski & Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Marrakesh Treaty for Visually 
Impaired Persons: Why A Treaty Was Preferable to Soft Law, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 255 (2014) 
[hereinafter Kaminski & Yanisky-Ravid, Marrakesh Treaty]. 
 52. Ketzan, supra note 47, at 218–19. 
 53. “One of the best ways to learn objective facts about a culture is to study its language, as 
language courses tend to immerse students in multiple aspects of a society’s objective culture, 
including its history, literature, and art. Knowledge of a language also provides insight into a social 
group’s perception of reality.” Walter A. Wright, Practical Steps for Acquiring Cross-Cultural 
Negotiation Skills, 70 TEX. B.J. 590, 590 (2007). 
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C. What Makes Translation Good? When is AI Translation Bad? 
Italian writer Italo Calvino—who translated the works of French 
author Raymond Queneau54—once observed that “translating is the real 
way to read a text . . . for an author, reflecting on the translation of a text 
he has written, discussing it with the translator, is the real way to read his 
own work, to understand what he has written and why.”55 In his book, Dire 
Quasi la Stessa Cosa: Esperienze di Traduzione (“Saying Almost the Same 
Thing: Experiences in Translation”), Umberto Eco mused that if we can 
agree that a good translation says “almost the same thing” as its source, 
we are still left pondering “how elastic must that ‘almost’ be?”56 The 
sensitivity to the language and style required for translation is evidenced 
by the number of translators who were also prolific writers, including 
Calvino, Eco, Charles Baudelaire, Cesare Pavese, Vladimir Nabokov, Jose 
Luis Borges, and Dorothy L. Sayers.57 
Good translations allow people to share ideas, creativity, criticism, 
culture, and literature with a wider audience, improving access to 
knowledge and debate. The world would be a darker place if English 
speakers could not read Anna Karenina and Spanish scientists could not 
study the works of Albert Einstein. Quality and accuracy matter, however, 
and largely depend on the fluency of translators in the cultures of the 
languages they are working with.58 When people communicate, they do so 
by making certain statements and leaving others unsaid; what a reader 
understands or a listener hears will often depend on community norms.59 
                                                     
 54. RAYMOND QUENEAU, I FIORI BLU (Italo Calvino trans., 2014). 
 55. ITALO CALVINO, MONDO SCRITTO E MONDO NON SCRITTO 80 (2002). 
 56. UMBERTO ECO, DIRE QUASI LA STESSA COSA: ESPERIENZE DI TRADUZIONE 10 (Bompiani 
4th ed. 2016). 
 57. See About Dorothy L Sayers, DOROTHY L. SAYERS SOC’Y, https://www.sayers 
.org.uk/biography [https://perma.cc/P83G-SYQC]; Richard D.E. Burton, Charles Baudelaire, 
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-Baudelaire [https:// 
perma.cc/D6FT-3VCZ]; Cesare Pavese, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Cesare-Pavese [https://perma.cc/23MD-9KLY]; Huw Nesbitt, 
Jorge Luis Borges’s Lost Translations, GUARDIAN: BOOKS BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2010/feb/19/jorge-luis-borges-di-giovanni [https:// 
perma.cc/8QHV-C3J3]; Vladimir Nabokov, The Art of Translation, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 4, 1941), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/62610/the-art-translation [https://perma.cc/5XBE-RPLC] . 
 58. See Sarah Yates, Scaling the Tower of Babel Fish: An Analysis of the Machine Translation 
of Legal Information, 98 L. LIBR. J. 481, 482 (2006) (“Anyone who has attempted to translate a 
document by simply looking up each word in a bilingual dictionary realizes that this method does not 
work. The translator must understand the language at the morphological, lexical, and syntactical 
levels; some would argue that understanding at the cultural level is equally indispensable.”). 
 59. See Gideon Toury, The Nature and Role of Norms in Translation, in THE TRANSLATION 
STUDIES READER 198 (Lawrence Venuti ed., 2000) (“Translation activities should rather be regarded 
as having cultural significance. Consequently, ‘translatorship’ amounts first and foremost to being 
able to play a social role, i.e., to fulfil a function allotted by a community . . . in a way which is deemed 
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Japanese culture, for example, considers saying “no” directly to be rude; 
yet the country’s cultural norms still afford citizens a linguistic means to 
decline dinner invitations, for example, in a way that would-be hosts may 
congenially comprehend.60 Good translators are not only sensitive to 
cultural differences, they are also fluent enough in both languages to 
capture variations in formality, humor, idiomatic expressions, the positive 
or negative connotations of words, and the musicality of certain sounds, 
among other important factors.61 They make deliberate choices about 
whether and to what extent a text should retain foreign sounds, images, 
and words, and if a text should read as though it had not been translated at 
all.62 
In addition, languages are constantly evolving, and our 
understanding of words continues to change over time.63 For example, in 
the early twentieth century in the United States, the word “Negro” was 
considered polite and unremarkable—it was, after all, in the name of the 
United Negro College Fund, and the title of eminent black historian and 
civil rights activist W.E.B. Du Bois’s study, The Philadelphia Negro—but 
today it is perceived as dated, condescending, and racist.64 As linguist 
George Steiner noted, “[a]ny thorough reading of a text out of the past of 
one’s own language and literature is a manifold act of interpretation.”65 
Like readers of major works of literature, good translators must pay 
attention to the time in which a text was written in order to capture an 
author’s intended meaning.66 All of these tasks are difficult, if not 
                                                     
appropriate in its own terms of reference.”). See generally LIVES IN TRANSLATION: BILINGUAL 
WRITERS ON IDENTITY AND CREATIVITY (Isabelle de Courtivron ed., 2003). 
 60. JON P. ALSTON & ISAO TAKEI, JAPANESE BUSINESS CULTURE AND PRACTICES: A GUIDE TO 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JAPANESE BUSINESS 43 (2005) (“It is best not to ask a Japanese a question 
demanding either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. Because Japanese do not like to say ‘no,’ such a question is 
answered either by a ‘yes’ or by a vague statement that does not obligate the speaker. Saying ‘no’ 
bluntly is considered impolite and aggressive.”). 
 61. See, e.g., APRILIA ZANK, THE WORD IN THE WORD: LITERARY TEXT RECEPTION AND 
LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY 158 (2013) (“The first prerequisite for a competent translator is, doubtlessly, 
very good command of both the target language . . . and the source.”). 
 62. See BELLOS, supra note 23, at 44–59. 
 63. Robin I. M. Dunbar, The Origin and Subsequent Evolution of Language, in LANGUAGE 
EVOLUTION (Morten H. Christiansen and Simon Kirby eds., 2003) (“Language has two remarkable 
properties. First, it allows us to communicate ideas with each other; second, languages evolve and 
diversify with a speed and facility that is quite unique within biological evolution.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Tess Owen, The Words ‘Oriental’ and ‘Negro’ Can No Longer be Used in US 
Federal Laws, VICE (May 21, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/the-words-oriental-and-negro-can-
no-longer-be-used-in-us-federal-laws [https://perma.cc/3F6R-XCQH] (“The law targets two anti-
discrimination areas of US law that use antiquated language to describe racial or ethnic groups.”). 
 65. STEINER, supra note 26, at 18. This work provides a lengthy analysis of the significance of 
languages and translation. 
 66. See Peter Messent, Censoring Mark Twain’s ‘N-Words’ Is Unacceptable, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
5, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2011/jan/05/censoring-mark-twain-n-word-
unacceptable [https://perma.cc/K79H-3AW8] (arguing that although Mark Twain used the word 
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impossible, for an AI translation program to achieve with fluency because 
such work requires in-depth understanding, not merely a statistical 
analysis of data. 
In fact, although AI translation tools have dramatically improved and 
continue to evolve, they are often unreliable and might always remain so. 
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, a well-known Israeli mathematician and linguist, 
spent years working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
developing machine translation, but even he expressed doubts about the 
feasibility of fully automatic, high quality translation systems.67 “By not 
realizing the practical futility” of the goal of perfect machine translation, 
Bar-Hillel argued that its enthusiasts had misled themselves, and the 
agencies sponsoring their research, into believing that the “real thing” (the 
perfect and efficient translation) was just around the corner.68 Bar-Hillel 
stressed that it would have made more sense to consider the potential 
applications for imperfect automated translation systems.69 
Although nearly sixty years have passed since Bar-Hillel published 
his paper in 1960, not much has changed. Recently, translator Douglas 
Hofstadter illustrated the inability of Google Translate to accurately 
translate simple sentences that would not have posed much of a challenge 
to sufficiently fluent human translators.70 The problem, he argued, was that 
“[m]achine translation has never focused on understanding language. 
Instead, the field has always tried to ‘decode’—to get away without 
worrying about what understanding and meaning are.”71 A lack of 
precision, an inability to perceive nuance, and the lack of an “ear” for 
language might afflict some human translators, but these problems are 
inherent for machines. Understanding the fascinating processes underlying 
AI translation systems, which we discuss later in this Article, helps explain 
the persistence of these problems.72 
The standards of reliability used for the translation of court 
documents provide a good metric for evaluating the reliability of AI 
translation systems from a legal perspective. If the latter is appropriate 
only in limited circumstances, where quality and accuracy are of 
                                                     
“nigger” many times in Huckleberry Finn, the novel should be understood as anti-racist and the word 
should not be edited out). 
 67. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, A Demonstration of the Nonfeasibility of Fully Automatic High Quality 
Translation, in LANGUAGE AND INFORMATION 174–79 (1964). See generally Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, 
Some Linguistic Problems Connected with Machine Translation, 20 PHIL. SCI. 217 (1953). 
 68. Bar-Hillel, supra note 67.  
 69. Bar-Hillel, supra note 67. 
 70. Douglas Hofstadter, The Shallowness of Google Translate, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/the-shallowness-of-google-
translate/551570 [https://perma.cc/Y2X9-HX4J]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See infra Part III. 
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secondary importance, then we ask: can we appropriately implement this 
policy guideline to make such distinctions regarding the web, where AI 
systems now routinely provide coarse translations of copyrighted material, 
to the general public? In this sense, we argue that the pervasive 
inaccuracies of AI translation should inform any discussion about 
balancing access to knowledge with the rights of authors in the copyright 
regime. If AI translation cannot be consistently relied upon for formulaic 
texts, then when it is used for more colloquial and colorful works, the 
underlying copyright violation becomes even more pertinent because a 
poor quality translation may violate an author’s moral rights in places 
where these are legally recognized.73 Yet web users rely on AI translation 
for all sorts of material, and this issue gets scant attention. 
Another related problem relates to the biases inherently embedded in 
AI systems in general.74 This issue is crucial when we discuss AI 
translation systems’ lack of linguistic understanding. Professionals in a 
wide range of industries have greeted the arrival of AI systems 
enthusiastically, focusing on their efficiency and ability to process vast 
troves of data.75 AI systems are now involved in hiring and firing, granting 
loans, evaluating tenants, and deciding which airline passengers should be 
on the No Fly List.76 Yet, despite their usefulness, AI systems can also 
                                                     
 73. “The non-economic interests of authors are found worthy of protection because of the 
presumed intimate bond between authors and their works, which are almost universally understood to 
be an extension of the author’s personhood. The standard set of moral rights recognized in the literature 
consists of the author’s right to claim authorship (right of attribution), the right to object to 
modifications of the work (right of integrity), the right to decide when and how the work in question 
will be published (right of disclosure), and the right to withdraw a work after publication (right of 
withdrawal).” Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 355–56 
(2006). 
 74. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean Hallisey, “Equality and Privacy by Design”: A New Model 
of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor Regimes, 46 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428 (2019) (describing many types of biases in AI systems). 
 75. “Generally, big data analytics focuses on examining large data sets to gather useful 
information to help organizations make more-informed business decisions. Businesses are capitalizing 
on this newfound ability by overhauling the ways in which they source and evaluate candidates, 
analyze attrition risks, optimize individual and team performance, identify safety risks, provide 
wellness guidance and resources, and much more.” Nathaniel M. Glasser et al., Big Data, People 
Analytics and Employment Decisions: The Rewards and Often-Overlooked Risks, WESTLAW J. EMP., 
Mar. 27, 2018, at 1. 
 76. See Yanisky-Ravid & Hallisey, supra note 74 (noting that data can be illegal, discriminatory, 
manufactured, unreliable, or simply incomplete, and that the more data AI systems “swallow,” the 
greater the likelihood they will contribute to biased, discriminatory decisions or could violate privacy. 
The article discusses how discrimination can arise, even inadvertently, from the operation of “trusted” 
and “objective” AI systems, and advocates for increased transparency); see also Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1297 (2008); Joshua A. Kroll et al., 
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017) (“The tools currently available to 
policymakers, legislators, and courts were developed to oversee human decisionmakers and often fail 
when applied to computers instead. For example, how do you judge the intent of a piece of software? 
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generate biased results that violate fundamental rights or, at the very least, 
flout social norms.77 Safiya Umoja Noble, for example, has highlighted 
the sexist and racist failures of algorithmic data.78 Privacy scholar Danielle 
Keats Citron has argued that automated systems’ lack of notice and 
transparency jeopardizes due process norms and further, that 
“[a]utomation encourages agencies to adopt overly simplified policy, 
which can more easily be translated into code.”79 In the translation context, 
while Turkish uses the same pronoun, “o” for he and she, until recently, 
when Google Translate was asked to translate “o bir doctor” (he or she is 
a doctor) into English, it defaulted to the masculine “he is a doctor.”80 
We do not pretend that human translators are free of biases; any 
choice of words reflects personal perspective and experience. However, 
human translators do understand the meaning of the words before them 
and are capable of making nuanced distinctions. The now pervasive 
presence of AI translation services, their reliance on opaque data, and the 
influence of automation bias—that is, the global populace’s general trust 
of algorithmic results—all suggest that our enthusiasm for these products 
should not blind us to their weaknesses.81 
                                                     
Because automated decision systems can return potentially incorrect, unjustified, or unfair results, 
additional approaches are needed to make such systems accountable and governable.”). 
 77. See Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 636; see also Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Code 
Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm Age, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithm-age 
[https://perma.cc/4JVK-NY4Z]. 
 78. SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE 
RACISM 4 (2018) (arguing that search algorithms produce racist results because they reflect the biases 
of the people who develop them). 
 79. See Citron, supra note 76, at 1297. 
 80. See Li Zhou, Is Your Software Racist?, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.politico. 
com/agenda/story/2018/02/07/algorithmic-bias-software-recommendations-000631 [https://perma. 
cc/B93E-JK4K].  
Google’s Translate tool “learns” language from an existing corpus of writing, and the 
writing often includes cultural patterns regarding how men and women are described. 
Because the model is trained on data that already has biases of its own, the results that it 
spits out serve only to further replicate and even amplify them. It might seem strange that 
a seemingly objective piece of software would yield gender-biased results, but the problem 
is an increasing concern in the technology world . . . Voice-based assistants, like Amazon’s 
Alexa, have struggled to recognize different accents. A Microsoft chatbot on Twitter 
started spewing racist posts after learning from other users on the platform. In a particularly 
embarrassing example in 2015, a black computer programmer found that Google’s photo-
recognition tool labeled him and a friend as “gorillas.” 
Id. For further discussion of this issue, see James Zou & Londa Schiebinger, AI Can Be Sexist and 
Racist—It’s Time to Make it Fair, 559 NATURE INT’L J. SCI. 324 (July 12, 2018). 
 81. See Citron, supra note 76, at 1271–72 (“[H]uman beings rely on automated decisions even 
when they suspect system malfunction. The impulse to follow a computer’s recommendation flows 
from human ‘automation bias’—the ‘use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant 
information seeking and processing.’ Automation bias effectively turns a computer program’s 
suggested answer into a trusted final decision.”). 
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E. Translation and Copyright Protection 
The right of authors to original and derivative copyrights in their 
works is guaranteed internationally. For example, the Berne International 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne 
Convention) defines translation as a protected derivative work that authors 
own and control.82 The United States Copyright Act of 1976 also 
recognizes translation as a derivative work, in which the author holds 
exclusive rights.83 Copyright’s legal protections even extend to intangible 
goods presented to the public, and there is no exception for the internet: 
copyright law protects works even when they are accessible to all in 
cyberspace, and even when they can be easily downloaded and copied.84 
No registration or special display symbol is necessary; once fixed in “any 
tangible medium of expression,”85 authors have automatic copyright 
protection for their original creative works.86 In other words, the mere fact 
that copyrighted works exist online in an easy-to-access format does not 
mean they are not protected or that they have become public domain. 
When authors’ works appear on the web, they serve as a constant 
source of free material for large, for-profit entities such as Google and 
Microsoft, who make significant financial gain from their translation—
precisely the type of exploitation that copyright law seeks to prevent. 
Because the internet is global, by examining the theoretical justifications 
for copyright law and the relevant legal norms in four countries—the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France—this Article 
brings a wider comparative and global view of copyright protection in the 
3A era. First, however, we address the evolution of AI systems in general 
and of AI translation systems specifically. 
                                                     
 82. “Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the exclusive 
right of making and of authorizing the translation of their works throughout the term of protection of 
their rights in the original works.” Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
art. 8, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 83. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).  
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original 
work of authorship, is a “derivative work.”  
Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2018). 
 84. See generally Robin Andrews, Note, Copyright Infringement and the Internet: An Economic 
Analysis of Crime, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 256 (2005). 
 85. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
 86. “[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright protection.” 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018). 
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AI TRANSLATION SYSTEMS 
Though definitions of AI vary, AI systems are generally understood 
as human-like systems that can perform complex tasks involving decision-
making, creativity, learning, development, and communication—systems 
that usually require human intelligence.87 Such systems are presently used 
in a variety of fields, from diagnostic medicine and automated weaponry 
to intelligence gathering, and from the world of art and inventions to that 
of contract drafting.88 
A. Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems: What, When, How 
As computers grew in popularity throughout the 1940s and became 
commercially available, their brain-like attributes caught the popular 
imagination.89 In 1946, the press described the Electronic Numerical 
Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) as a “giant brain,” and, thereafter, 
computers regularly outperformed humans in mathematical exercises and 
games such as chess. 
In his well-known article Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 
computer scientist and mathematician Alan Turing considered the ability 
of machines to think, observing that “[i]ntelligent behaviour presumably 
consists in a departure from the completely disciplined behaviour involved 
in computation, but a rather slight one, which does not give rise to random 
behaviour, or to pointless repetitive loops.”90 Nearly seventy years later, 
technological advances have brought AI programs increasingly into the 
public awareness, yet even experts in the field struggle to agree on a 
precise definition for AI, largely because intelligence is an ambiguous 
concept even for humans.91 Today, instead of emphasizing machines’ 
abilities to perform tasks, AI definitions tend to “focus on the concept of 
machines that work to achieve goals.”92 
                                                     
 87. See Person, supra note 7; see also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 7. 
 88. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, Copyrightability of Artworks 
Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
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 92. Id. at 361. 
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AI systems can be described as those “capable of performing tasks 
that would normally require human intelligence, [evidenced by] 
recognition, decision-making, creation, learning, evolving, and 
communicating,” or that allow humans to reach their goals more 
efficiently by processing data.93 While early AI “expert systems” ran by 
applying rules input by humans, today AI systems function via “neural 
networks” that imitate human brain functions by analyzing patterns within 
the data they process and learning through trial and error.94 For example, 
in 2003, Raymond Kurzweil patented his Cybernetic Poet, a program 
which analyzes poems written by human authors, creates a word-sequence 
model, and generates new, original verse in the same style.95 The Next 
Rembrandt project sought to expose a computer to as many digital copies 
of Rembrandt’s works as possible in order to teach it not only to replicate 
those paintings, but also to generate new ones with a similar look without 
any further input from the software developers and art historians.96 Famed 
auction house Christie’s sold its first piece of AI-generated portraiture for 
$432,500.97 Nowadays, AI systems also produce music and many other 
sorts of creative works.98 
                                                     
 93. Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 673. 
 94. Id. at 675. 
 95. Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 36.  
Raymond Kurzweil was granted United States Patent No. 6,647,395 for 
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Id.  
 96. See Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 663–64 (describing the AI-
produced Rembrandt Project and the questions of ownership and accountability it raises). 
 97. The work sold for nearly forty-five times its high estimate. See Is Artificial Intelligence Set 
to Become Art’s Next Medium?, CHRISTIE’S (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.christies.com/features/A-
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also Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7. 
 98. For a demonstration of jazz music produced by an AI system, see AI and Intellectual 
Property Law Featuring Prof. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
PODCAST (May 4, 2018), http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2018/05/04/episode-51-ai-and-intellectual-
property-law [https://perma.cc/DYW2-XSEY] (featuring audio of a jazz composition generated by an 
AI system at the 14:05 mark); see also, e.g., Dani Deahl, How AI-Generated Music is Changing the 
Way Hits are Made, VERGE (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/17777008/ 
artificial-intelligence-taryn-southern-amper-music [https://perma.cc/PK9D-HXC7] (noting that 
“music-making AI software has advanced so far in the past few years that it’s no longer a frightening 
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The publishing industry is also experimenting with AI uses in 
journalism; a Los Angeles Times journalist developed an algorithm called 
Quakebot, which produces simplistic news stories based on United States 
Geological Survey reports, and companies such as Narrative Science and 
Automated Insights have also experimented with AI uses for the news 
business.99 Though AI news stories still remain on the fringes of the news 
market and do not always sound quite right to readers, interest in the 
potential applications for the evolving technology still remains high.100 
Despite the overwhelming enthusiasm for AI systems, some 
commentators have raised concerns about the ways in which they produce 
biased results and may perpetuate undesirable forms of discrimination by 
relying on unrepresentative data sets.101 
B. AI Translation Systems 
AI translation systems are computer systems which can translate 
content with or without human assistance; they are not translation tools, 
such as online dictionaries or terminology forums.102 The systems may be 
designed to be bilingual or multilingual, unidirectional or bidirectional.103 
The oldest type of translation system functions with a “direct translation” 
approach: designed for a specific pairing of languages, it operates by 
moving from the source language unidirectionally to a target language 
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an active participant in the creative process.”). 
 100. Denicola, supra note 99, at 261. See generally Lin Weeks, Note, Media Law and Copyright 
Implications of Automated Journalism, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 67 (2014) (describing 
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 101. See generally Michele Willson, Algorithms (and the) Everyday, 20 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 
137 (2016). 
 102. See generally W. John Hutchins, Machine Translation: A Brief History, in CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE LANGUAGE SCIENCES: FROM THE SUMERIANS TO THE COGNITIVISTS 431–45 (Ernst 
F. K. Koerner & Ronald E. Asher eds., 1995). 
 103. Id. 
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using certain rules.104 An example of a programming rule might specify 
that the English “you” can be either “vous” or “tu” in French.105 A second 
type of translation system, known as “interlingua,” relies on two stages of 
translation: first, from a source language into an intermediate 
“interlingua,” and then, from the interlingua into the target language.106 
This type of system may rely on an artificial, or auxiliary, language as a 
cushion between the source and target languages.107 It digitally identifies 
patterns and similarities among all languages and then creates a new 
language that synthesizes all common structures before translating the data 
to the target language. A third type of translation system follows a transfer 
approach: converting source language texts into abstract representations, 
then converting into the target language equivalent representations, and 
finally, into the target language text.108 In each of these methods, the AI 
system relies on a constant input of new data, meaning that the data 
provider or machine “trainer” are a vital part of the system’s functioning. 
The first automated translation systems began to appear in the 1930s 
and gradually improved throughout the remaining decades of the twentieth 
century, particularly in the United States, Soviet Union, Japan, and 
Europe.109 Commercial interest in translation gained momentum 
throughout the 1990s alongside the rise of the internet.110 
Today, AI translation systems are everywhere: on mobile phones, 
computers, virtual assistants, and many other devices.111 Business use of 
online, simultaneous translation continues to expand as the available 
systems improve. Users, in fact, play an active role in the development of 
AI translation tools by providing feedback and language corrections.112 
The following discussion will focus on this unique role of users around the 
globe, and their important contribution to the development of AI 
translation systems, which evolve with every additional piece of data. 
C. Users as Data and Feedback Providers 
A unique and interesting feature of AI online translation systems is 
the involvement and contribution of the users in improving and 
programming them. AI systems function thanks to an array of 
stakeholders, which one of this Article’s authors, Dr. Yanisky-Ravid, has 
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 105. Ketzan, supra note 47, at 212. 
 106. Hutchins, supra note 102. 
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 109. Id.; see also Ketzan, supra note 47, at 209. 
 110. See Ketzan, supra note 47, at 210. 
 111. See Gershgorn, supra note 9. 
 112. See infra Part III. 
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referred to as “the multi-player model.”113 The players in this model 
include software developers, data suppliers, trainers who provide 
feedback, owners and operators, manufacturers and even, possibly, the 
state and insurance companies.114 Because these systems rely on large 
volumes of data, data providers perform a vital role in the development of 
any AI system.115 Likewise, AI translation systems depend on receiving a 
massive amount of data and feedback in all languages, without which they 
cannot function properly.116 To meet this need, AI translation is 
remarkable in its reliance on crowd wisdom.117 In other words, by using 
AI translation systems, we all become players, improving them by 
providing data and feedback. Thus, we not only use and enjoy the systems, 
we also refine their abilities. Google Translate, for one, has encouraged its 
users around the world to be data providers and AI trainers, who correct 
the system and help fine-tune its translations, thus transforming users into 
an integral part of the multi-player model.118 The boundaries between 
users and system developers blur in never-ending, evolving cycles of 
machine learning and improving. The significant contributions of AI 
translation program users might, however, have legal consequences from 
a copyright perspective.119 
In some respects, Google Translate and similar programs mirror the 
work of human translators. The machines look at a sentence and must 
decide on a likely appropriate equivalent in the target language based on 
data previously encountered from users.120 Moreover, AI systems’ ability 
to process vast amounts of data at a high volume in some contexts makes 
them more efficient than human translators.121 AI translation tools rely on 
a translation memory, “a database that stores previously translated 
segments,” and before they translate a file of segments, they analyze how 
                                                     
 113. See Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt, supra note 7, at 691–93 (discussing questions 
of ownership and accountability for works produced by AI systems); see also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, 
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the Crowd—With Confidence, 336 SCI. 303, 303–04 (2012). 
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many translated segments are available for reuse.122 Similarly, a human 
translator must read a sentence and draw on previous experience and 
knowledge of the target language to propose a translation that sounds as 
smooth and similar to the original as possible.123 
Nevertheless, the question of whether AI online translation systems 
can ever truly replace the work of human translators remains open. Word 
meanings are context-dependent, and people who speak several languages 
have a nuanced cultural understanding of written expression that eludes 
even the most high-level machines.124 AI translation systems—unlike 
human beings—plug in their solutions based on data input, following what 
might be described as the “Chinese Room” method, meaning that a correct 
output can result without knowing whether the machine understands the 
meaning as humans do (or think they do).125 By contrast, human translators 
actually understand thoughts, emotions, and the words they read, and can, 
therefore, better grapple with ambiguities and have a higher potential for 
accuracy.126 
In an article comparing accuracy assessments for machine translation 
with similar assessments for human translators, linguists and researchers 
Marina Fomicheva and Lucia Specia described a conceptual flaw: machine 
translations are usually evaluated in comparison to a human translation, 
instead of to their original source text—which is the standard method for 
reviewing human translations.127 Implicit in this approach is the 
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assumption “that the task of translation has a single correct solution,” 
when in fact, “except for very short sentences or very specific technical 
domains, the same source sentence may be correctly translated in many 
different ways.”128 Thus, even in the way it is assessed, AI translation lags 
behind the richness and greater accuracy of human translation. 
In sum, AI online translation systems have many advantages. 
Compared to human translators, they are faster, more instantly accessible, 
cheaper, and convenient in that they operate in almost every language. 
However, even though human translation has never been perfect, AI online 
translation systems lack some significant human abilities and therefore 
present major drawbacks, limitations, and new challenges, all of which 
will be discuss in the following subsection. 
D. The Limitations of AI Translation 
Throughout history, translations have been both an important 
communication tool and a source of tension.129 In his book, Through the 
Language Glass, Israeli linguist Guy Deutscher muses over the following 
questions: “[i]s [language] an artifact of culture or a bequest of nature? If 
we hold language up as a mirror to the mind, what do we see reflected 
there: human nature or the cultural conventions of our society?”130 One 
might ask related questions of translations: how closely do they capture 
the cultural ideas and imagery expressed in the original works they are 
based on? Must they be done by humans to properly convey meaning, or 
are machines just as capable of reflecting nuanced ideas? 
Over the past several decades, there has been an increase in the global 
use of online translation services. AI translation systems go far beyond 
Google’s famous translation tool, encompassing a variety of services. Not 
only can web users read content translated into multiple languages by 
pasting text into a box or by asking the service to translate an entire web 
page, but they can also access lectures, movies, songs, and books—which 
are just as easily translated into any widely spoken language—in a single 
click.131 Many AI web translation services are freely accessible, while 
some are only available to software brand customers.132 Yet, because AI 
translation services rely on data and statistics rather than personal 
understanding, they cannot replicate all the nuances of human languages, 
idioms, and colloquial expressions, so AI-translated results are often a 
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distorted reflection of original works. For example, AI translations of web 
pages are frequently rough and inaccurate, while AI translations of 
copyrightable books or papers contain many mistakes.133 We argue that, 
given the polemics that have so often surrounded translations throughout 
history, future copyright disputes over the unauthorized linguistic efforts 
of machines are inevitable. 
AI translation relies on technology to convert text from one language 
into another by continuously collecting linguistic data and sorting it, 
creating new and more accurate patterns with each additional piece of 
data.134 Although AI translations have greatly improved over the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, significant differences in quality and accuracy 
between machine and human translations still remain. While these 
differences might diminish over time, they are unlikely to completely 
disappear, especially as some languages have been translated more than 
others, leading to differences in the availability of training data for 
machines.135 In short, AI translations remain unsophisticated compared to 
those produced by people.136 This inherent drawback raises questions 
about appropriate uses of translation and how such uses may affect the 
market for authors’, as well as human translators’, copyrighted works. 
In some contexts, the rough-around-the-edges nature of AI 
translations poses no great problem, as the stakes are low and, therefore, 
less harmful. In such contexts, once the threats of AI translation have been 
acknowledged, these systems can be efficiently used. Reading a street sign 
or menu, driving with a taxi driver who does not understand your 
language, or asking for directions in a foreign country, all present 
examples of how AI translation is poised to efficiently facilitate 
communication, as compared to alternative, more threatening scenes. The 
internet is replete with gems such as “Take Luggage of Foreigner, No 
Charge.”137 If one’s goal is merely to broadly comprehend the subject 
                                                     
 133. See Ketzan, supra note 47, at 224 (noting that machine translation, “even excellent . . . has 
little to offer the fully bilingual human translator. The reason is that MT has a ‘tin ear,’ so to speak”). 
 134. See Yates, supra note 58, at 484. 
 135. See VR Ferose, Barney Pell & Lorien Pratt, From the Business of Language to the 
Language of Business: The Future of Translation Worldwide, DIGITALIST MAG. (May 17, 2018), 
https://www.digitalistmag.com/machine-learning-ai/2018/05/17/future-of-translation-worldwide-
06168565 [https://perma.cc/8EFK-R9DE] (“These less-translated languages have less training data, 
making the automation problem harder . . . .”). 
 136. See Ian Henderson, Chasing the Unicorn of Auto-Translation: Why Automation Tools Can’t 
Work for Businesses, WIRED (Aug. 2014), https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/08/chasing-unicorn-
auto-translation-automation-tools-cant-work-businesses [https://perma.cc/D9UW-EJZ3] (noting that 
“‘language’ is far more than just words” and that “[f]or machines to accurately translate, there needs 
to be as much abstract thinking as mathematical calculations”). 
 137. Chungcharn Or, Lost in Translation: Our Top 20 Picks, LONELY PLANET (Nov. 24, 2011), 
https://www.lonelyplanet.com/blog/2011/11/24/lost-in-translation-our-top-20-photos [https://perma. 
cc/C8ZU-EM9L]. 
128 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:99 
matter of a text, then AI translation works quite well. The European Patent 
Office (EPO) has even partnered with Google Translate to create an 
automated translation service for public patent documents.138 In this 
instance, the stated goal is to provide people with the ability to skim 
documents in various languages for a basic understanding of their 
content.139 “The machine translation system should give you the gist of 
any patent or patent-related document, and help you to determine whether 
it is relevant. You might decide on this basis whether you need to invest 
in a human translation of the document,” the EPO advises, adding: “Please 
note that the engine cannot provide legally binding translations.”140 In 
other words, as long as “the gist” of meaning suffices, AI translation can 
provide a valuable service and facilitate efficient research. In Found in 
Translation: How Language Shapes Our Lives and Transforms the World, 
authors Nataly Kelly and Jost Zetzsche came to the same conclusion, 
noting, “[F]or some projects, companies just want an approximate 
translation—they don’t care if the clothes fit properly, so long as they can 
be worn . . . . Automated translation does have its place, especially in 
certain industries.”141 
Problems arise, however, when the quality and accuracy of a 
translation are more important. In the medical field, where doctor-patient 
communication is vital to the provision of care, errors in automated 
translation can have serious consequences.142 United States judges have 
held that Google-translated documents do not satisfy the proper 
authentication requirements for extradition under 18 U.S.C. § 3190143 and 
have expressed strong skepticism of the accuracy of AI translation.144 
Linguist David Bellos observed that “you should never use [Google 
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Translate] to translate into a language you do not know very well. Use it 
only to translate into a language in which you are sure you can recognize 
nonsense.”145 
Ultimately, who should be responsible for the results of AI 
translation? How concerned should we be about the biases these results 
may contain? Who owns these new works? Who should benefit from 
them? These questions will be discussed first according to the traditional, 
derivative works approach, then through an examination of theoretical 
justifications for intellectual property law and, finally, according to the 
new model we propose in this study. 
E. The Hidden Biases of AI Translation Systems and Their Undesirable 
Results 
Like other AI systems, AI translation systems offer great benefits—
for instance, facilitating communication when perfect accuracy is not 
required—however, they also pose challenges related to their inability to 
perceive or understand nuance, as well as to the bias in their algorithms.146 
Thus, some of the same risks associated with AI systems in the 
employment or financial sectors also apply to online translation services. 
Because large firms dominate the AI sector, AI translation systems’ results 
may reflect the biases of these companies, or of society at large, if users 
provide feedback, as they can for Google Translate.147 If training data is 
flawed, discriminatory outcomes can occur, perpetuating society’s 
discriminatory attitudes. 
In an article entitled Accountable Algorithms, the authors discuss the 
lack of accountability mechanisms in place for software that makes 
decisions that formerly would have been made by individuals, arguing that 
the law has lagged behind as technology has leapfrogged ahead.148 In 
addition to advocating for greater collaboration between lawmakers and 
computer scientists, the authors highlight some of the problems that can 
emerge when algorithmic bias goes unchecked, noting that “[a] significant 
concern about automated decisionmaking is that it may simultaneously 
systematize and conceal discrimination,” and further, that “decisions made 
by computers may enjoy an undeserved assumption of fairness or 
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objectivity.”149 For example, a program designed to select the best 
applicants for a job may be trained using information about candidates a 
company has previously hired; if those candidates were predominantly 
male—not because they were better-qualified but because the former 
human resources director was sexist—then the algorithm will simply 
perpetuate the original bias, favoring male applicants over similarly 
qualified female applicants.150 Even when no malice is involved, an 
algorithm’s distorted analysis of statistics can lead to unfair results, for 
instance, by directing police officers to stop and frisk members of certain 
groups because, historically, those groups have “been the target of 
disproportionate enforcement.”151 
Although many scholars see the software as the main source of 
biases,152 a recent study suggested that the data, rather than the software, 
played a much more important role in creating and spreading biases.153 
According to this view, exposing AI systems to more data does not 
necessarily eliminate biases because society itself is biased, and the data 
therefore reflects sexism, racism, and a myriad of other social biases. 
Writing in Nature, an international journal of science, James Zou and 
Londa Schiebinger describe Google Translate converting Spanish news 
articles into English, transforming “she said” into “he said,” and a Nikon 
camera software perceiving Asians as always blinking.154 They argue that: 
A major driver of bias in AI is the training data. Most machine-
learning tasks are trained on large, annotated data sets . . . [i]n natural-
language processing, standard algorithms are trained on corpora 
consisting of billions of words. Researchers typically construct such 
data sets by scraping websites, such as Google Images and Google 
News, using specific query terms, or by aggregating easy-to-access 
information from sources such as Wikipedia. These data sets are then 
annotated, often by graduate students or through crowdsourcing 
platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Such methods can 
unintentionally produce data that encode gender, ethnic and cultural 
biases. Frequently, some groups are over-represented and others are 
under-represented.155 
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Because faulty algorithms can magnify biases through feedback 
loops, Zou and Schiebinger note that each time a program such as Google 
Translate defaults to a masculine pronoun, it increases that pronoun’s 
relative frequency on the web, “potentially reversing hard-won advances 
towards equity.”156 
Though linguist Bellos humorously advised Google Translate users 
to steer clear of the program unless they were familiar enough with their 
target language to recognize “nonsense,”157 the same users should also be 
on the lookout for bias. Many of those consulting AI translation services 
are, nonetheless, wholly unfamiliar with the languages for which they are 
seeking assistance and are, consequently, oblivious to any offense they 
may cause. We argue that when AI online translation systems switch male 
and female pronouns or use racist expressions, they are accurately 
mirroring social prejudices; however, instead of simply accepting and 
parroting back these prejudices, we would like to see the systems taking a 
more progressive linguistic stance. Previously, Yanisky-Ravid has argued 
that, when necessary, AI systems should disclose the data they rely on, and 
that an auditing and certification program for algorithms would incentivize 
industry to implement non-discriminatory best practices. Google is 
reportedly working to address its bias problems by offering both masculine 
and feminine translation options when both are appropriate, but so far, the 
improvements are limited. They are partially available, for example, only 
“when translating English into French, Italian, Portuguese or Spanish and 
when translating from Turkish to English.”158 How effective Google’s 
updates will be across its entire language repertoire remains to be seen. 
Regardless, the problem is that when users rely on AI online 
translation systems to convert a known language into an unknown one, 
they have no way of assessing the results and any biases remain concealed. 
These hidden biases are not the only problem with AI online translation 
systems. 
IV. TRANSLATION AND COPYRIGHT LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
Translations undoubtedly require creativity, but are they best 
understood as original or derivative works? The legal doctrine surrounding 
translations has changed over time, highlighting some of the tensions 
present in the current copyright issues of AI-generated translations. Here, 
we examine these questions more closely and conclude that if translations 
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continue to be classified as derivative works, a new legal and digital 
framework is needed to facilitate the use of AI translation systems while 
respecting the balancing goals of copyright law. 
A. The Past: Translation as a New Creative Work 
Authors have not always had the right to control the production of 
derivative works based on their original creations: in early copyright 
disputes, courts held that translating books without an author’s 
authorization was not infringement.159 For many years, judges perceived 
translations, abridgements, and improvements “as intellectual products of 
the second comers’ creativity” and believed that such new works 
“contributed to the advancement of knowledge—the very goal of modern 
copyright law.”160 
In the UK, some believed that a translation of a book fell outside the 
scope of the 1710 Statute of Anne, which provided for court enforcement 
of copyright law.161 In a famous English case, Burnett v. Chetwood, the 
Lord Chancellor agreed with the defendants, who stood accused of 
producing an unauthorized translation of a copyrighted book, that the 
statute “could be intended only to restrain the mechanical art of printing, 
and that others should not pirate the copy and gain an advantage to 
themselves by reprinting it” and should not apply to a translation of the 
book, “which in some respects may be called a different book, and the 
translator may be said to be the author, in as much as some skill in 
language is requisite thereto, and not barely a mechanic art, as in the case 
of reprinting in the same language.”162 In other words, because translation 
requires great skill and does not involve rote copying, it is better viewed 
as original work and thus the translation of a copyrighted work should not 
require the permission of the original author. 
Similarly, in the American case Stowe v. Thomas, the author Harriet 
Beecher Stowe sued a man for translating her copyrighted work, Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, into German and publishing it in chapters in a Philadelphia 
newspaper, Die Freie Presse.163 She had already hired and compensated a 
different translator, and the authorized translation was published and 
copyrighted.164 The court held that the unauthorized translation did not 
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violate Stowe’s rights as an author because it was not a copy, but rather an 
inventive work that borrowed her ideas, which were not subject to 
copyright: 
[t]o make a good translation of a work, often requires more learning, 
talent and judgment, than was required to write the original. Many 
can transfer from one language to another, but few can translate. To 
call the translations of an author’s ideas and conceptions into another 
language, a copy of his book, would be an abuse of terms, and 
arbitrary judicial legislation.165 
Nevertheless, in 1870 the United States Congress amended copyright 
law, providing authors with more control over the translation of their 
works, and in 1909, it established a careful list of derivatives that authors 
were allowed to manage.166 There was a sense that unauthorized 
translations unjustly enriched the infringer and hurt demand for the 
original work, even if unauthorized translations were most likely “to 
supplant demand for authorized derivatives than to supplant demand for 
the original.”167 Since a proliferation of bootleg translations would 
undermine authors’ discretion in choosing how to render their original 
works in new markets, the law was changed to grant authors greater 
control over translations of their works.168 
In Shook v. Rankin, an 1875 case from the Northern District of 
Illinois, complainants were the owners of an original, unpublished French 
manuscript that had been translated into English by a man named Jackson 
with the consent of the original authors.169 Defendants were performers 
who had acted out Jackson’s translation at a Chicago theater without his 
permission.170 They denied that Jackson had acquired any rights by his 
translation or copyright and argued that they intended to use a different 
translation, also produced with the consent of the original authors.171 The 
court enjoined defendants from using Jackson’s translation, but did not 
extend the injunction to the other translation.172 Noting that as an 
authorized translator of the play, Jackson was “in the sense of the law, the 
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author of that for which he obtained a copyright,” Circuit Judge 
Drummond said that he failed to see why Jackson “was not protected under 
the law for his translation and adaptation of the work to the stage, and of 
which he was in one sense the author.”173 
Debates over the appropriateness of giving authors control over 
translations of their works have not been fully extinguished. Today, with 
authors’ permission, translators can obtain the copyright to their 
translations, which then have the status of original, rather than derivative 
works.174 In a 1987 dispute between the writer of a biography of Igor 
Stravinsky and the composer’s former personal assistant, the latter 
asserted his inherited copyright to the English translations from Russian 
of some of Stravinsky’s correspondence.175 Though the plaintiff spoke no 
Russian, he had hired some Russian-speaking students to do initial, literal 
translations of the correspondence, and “thereafter he reworked the 
language, exercising his own authorship to achieve a diction he considered 
suitable,” recasting the translations “in such a way as to imitate the unusual 
manner in which Stravinsky spoke English.”176 The court agreed that 
Stravinsky’s former assistant had a strong copyright claim to the 
translations, either under a theory that his reworking of them was 
substantial and original or under a “work for hire” theory involving the 
students.177 
Translations of religious works have long been, and continue to be, 
a source of conflict. Agreeing that a translation of an English prayer-book 
into Hebrew was sufficiently original to be copyrightable, the court in 
Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc. said that 
“[t]he translation process requires exercise of careful literary and scholarly 
judgment.”178 Further, in Society of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. 
v. Gregory, a Greek Orthodox monastery that had produced original 
translations of ancient religious works brought a copyright infringement 
suit against an archbishop who had left the order and posted some of the 
translations on his own website.179 One of the archbishop’s arguments, in 
his defense, was that the works at issue were not original and therefore not 
copyrightable—that they were “merely a commixture of various ancient 
religious works that had previously been translated into English” with 
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minor changes.180 The Monastery argued that its translations were both 
original and entitled to copyright protection under the Copyright Act’s 
“express acknowledgement of the copyrightability of derivative works.”181 
The court agreed that translations may be original and copyrightable 
despite being derivative, as long as “there is originality in [the works’] 
arrangement or selection.”182 The court also rejected the archbishop’s 
argument that the “merger doctrine,” by which a copyright may be held 
invalid if there is only a limited number of ways to express a given idea, 
as “inapposite” because “the art of translation involves choices among 
many possible means of expressing ideas.”183 
By contrast, in Signo Trading Intern. Ltd. v. Gordon, a translator who 
had been commissioned by the manufacturer of an electronic translation 
system to translate English words into Arabic did not have a copyright 
claim because the lists of words did not have the requisite degree of 
originality and because the words on the list had been chosen by the 
manufacturer.184 
Echoing some of the views underlying the Chetwood and Stowe 
opinions, in The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of 
Difference, translator, translation theorist, and historian Lawrence Venuti 
argues that translations are a unique category of derivative work in that 
they do not involve literally copying a foreign text, but instead enter “into 
a mimetic relation that inevitably deviates from the foreign language by 
relying on target-language approximations.”185 Far from limiting the 
market for an author’s work, Venuti suggests that translations may 
potentially expand it “by demonstrating its value abroad.”186 He advocates 
modifying the current copyright regime to incentivize translators, so that 
if an author has not made use of translation rights within five years of 
publishing a work, the first translator or publisher to translate that work 
should be entitled to enjoy an exclusive translation right in the work for as 
long as the translation remains in print.187 
We argue that debates over the originality or derivative nature of 
translations have thus far considered only human translators, but an urgent 
need still remains to consider how applicable notions of originality and 
derivation are to AI translations, for reasons we will discuss further. 
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B. The Present: Translation as a Derivative Work and the Author as 
Owner 
Currently, both United States law and international intellectual 
property law view translations as derivative works, that is, as new products 
containing significant portions of existing, copyrightable works.188 In 
other words, a translated work is considered the original work dressed in 
a different cloak.189 Whereas in the past, translations were necessarily the 
work of multilingual individuals, in today’s 3A era, translations may also 
be the product of popular AI translation programs, especially online.190 
However, machine translations continue to lack the sophistication of those 
produced by humans.191 
There are five legal implications of defining translated works as 
derivative. First, users of AI translation systems become infringers, subject 
to legal penalties, when they translate copyrighted works without authors’ 
permissions. Second, anyone who wishes to translate a copyrighted work 
must seek permission from the work’s author, who may grant a license for 
the translation of the work.192 Third, users of AI translation may have to 
pay authors for these licenses. Fourth, the author owns the resulting 
translation, which is the legal default even when an author has granted 
permission for a work to be translated; of course, the parties can negotiate 
another outcome. Fifth, as long as the author owns the rights to a 
translation, the author is entitled to any benefits resulting from the 
translation; thus, the user should pay royalties to the author.193 
In the United States, copyright protection extends to all “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
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device.”194 Little is required to satisfy the notion of originality in United 
States copyright law, as the Supreme Court explained in its cornerstone 
copyright case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 
Inc.: “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work 
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”195 
Examples of original works include literary, musical, dramatic, pictorial, 
and architectural creations.196 Internationally, the Berne Convention states 
that it covers “every production in the literary, scientific, and artistic 
domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression,” and cites 
“books, pamphlets and other writings” as examples.197 While the 
Convention does not list originality as a prerequisite for copyright 
protection, “most member states have an originality and independent 
creation requirement.”198 
In contrast to an original work, a derivative work is one “based upon 
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, 
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”199 International copyright 
law considers translation an important form of derivative work.200 The 
1886 Berne Convention first addressed the issue of copyright and 
translation at the global level, granting authors the exclusive right to make 
or authorize translations of their works for ten years.201 The 1896 revision 
to the Convention extended this right to cover the entire copyright term, 
and the 1908 revision “finally assimilated the translation right into general 
reproduction rights.”202 
Among the exclusive rights granted to authors of original works, the 
Berne Convention lists “the right to translate”203 and “moral rights” which 
encompass “the right to claim authorship of the work and the right to 
object to any mutilation, deformation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the work that would be prejudicial to the 
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author’s honor or reputation.”204 Since translations are derivative, authors 
may protect the moral rights to their works by giving or withholding their 
consent to commercial translations of their works.205 
C. The Future Is Already Here: Are the Products of AI Translation 
Derivative Works? 
Authors own their copyrightable works. Therefore, applying the 
derivative work doctrine to AI translation means that users of online AI 
translation programs—including, but not limited to, Google Translate—
infringe stakeholders’ rights by creating unauthorized derivative works. 
We argue that in the 3A era this conclusion faces challenges. First, 
as globalization has made the notion of community international, online 
translation tools have become a primary means of participating in cultural 
life, enjoying the arts, and sharing in scientific advancement, as well as 
seeking, receiving, and imparting “information and ideas of all kinds.”206 
Allowing citizens to become acquainted with poems, stories, news and 
other written material online through internet access is especially 
important where access to such material offline may be limited or 
nonexistent. Following this logic, the international community agreed in 
the Marrakesh Treaty to create an exception to copyright law so that 
visually impaired persons, who often lack access to writings, could access 
copyrighted written materials by using digital tools to transfer the words 
to audible form.207 On the other hand, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights also guarantees the moral rights of authors, and even where works 
are translated by machines, copyright law and the derivative works 
doctrine are applicable.208 
AI online translation services are not human; however, humans are 
the investors in and software designers of AI translation programs, and 
they turn a profit from the use of these programs in the marketplace. In 
Naruto et al. v. David Slater, the Ninth Circuit, citing the United States 
Copyright Office, held that non-human animals could not be copyright 
holders, associating authorship with a person’s control over a work.209 In 
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Naruto, an Indonesian macaque was found to have no copyright in a selfie 
he had taken with a photographer’s camera because the Copyright Act 
makes no mention of non-human animals;210 United States courts have 
repeatedly referred to “persons” or “human beings” when analyzing 
copyright authorship. Following the logic of the Naruto case, which 
awarded authorship of the photograph to the photographer who set up the 
camera, AI online translation authorship lies with the private companies 
financing and developing the AI software. Naruto was not a participant in 
the human economy, but companies such as Google are. 
Another consideration is the active role users play in generating new 
AI translations by providing corrections and suggested improvements. 
There is a strong argument that existing copyright law fails to capture this 
scenario, which sees many people contributing to a machine’s translation. 
Even if the software that allows a machine to translate is the result of 
programming and data-feeding by humans, who could be considered the 
authors of whatever the machine generates, the presence of other 
contributors muddies the waters. Consider the parallels with open-source 
software: “Open source licenses . . . allow software to be freely used, 
modified, and shared.”211 The code in programs such as Linux “is free and 
available to the public to view, edit, and—for users with the appropriate 
skills—to contribute to.”212 On AI online translation platforms, should 
contributors be entitled to a share of the profits from their work? The 
precise terms under which contributors correct online AI translations are 
often unclear, yet the companies producing the software systems benefit 
greatly from user contributions. Another relevant parallel is with the 
comment sections of major news websites, where individuals contribute 
their insights regarding current events and drive traffic to the websites. 
Should they have no intellectual property rights to their comments? We 
argue that the law is unclear on these issues, which are central to AI online 
translation platforms. 
Finally, the broad, far-reaching use of AI online translation systems 
on computers and smartphones around the globe makes their post-hoc 
regulation through the application of existing law difficult, as consumers 
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have grown accustomed to using these tools.213 Enforcing existing 
copyright law would be akin to banning all music downloads in the 
Napster case214—possible, but what would be the result and would it best 
serve the balancing goals of copyright law? 
Taken together, these challenges posed by AI translation online 
reveal a glaring legal void. The popularity of AI online translation and its 
importance should prompt us to consider how the law can efficiently 
address these issues. There are three approaches to address this question: 
(1) existing law can sufficiently address these new situations and nothing 
need be done save enforce copyright law and shut down online AI 
translation programs; (2) IP laws in general, including copyright laws, are 
so outdated as to be unusable when examining AI systems;215 and (3) 
certain sections of copyright law have become outdated, and amendments 
to existing law that take technological innovation into consideration are 
necessary. Consider, for instance, that AI systems such as New 
Rembrandt, are capable of producing their own art work and inventions; 
these developments are not unlike AI translation. Yanisky-Ravid and 
Luis–Antonio Velez–Hernandez previously suggested revising the legal 
understanding of the term “creativity” so that it might encompass artworks 
generated by AI systems.216 Here, we argue that while the balancing goals 
of intellectual property laws remain relevant, AI systems present such 
significant challenges to existing legislation and regulation that new legal 
and digital tools are needed.217 
V. RETHINKING COPYRIGHT’S APPLICABILITY TO AI TRANSLATION 
Current copyright law defines users of AI translation tools as 
lawbreakers, subject to severe penalties for their infringement. The 
following discussion re-examines copyright law in the 3A Era and 
challenges the system to better address and regulate the near-universal use 
of AI translation systems. We first analyze the use of this advanced 
technology from the perspective of copyright law before discussing the 
troubling ramifications of this analysis and how to address them. Like 
many other web-based products and services, AI translation systems pose 
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specific copyright conundrums that, left unexamined, lead to a poor 
balancing of the interests at the heart of intellectual property law. 
A. Theoretical Justifications: The Tension Between Authors’ Rights and 
Sharing Knowledge 
Justifications for intellectual property laws and copyright take 
various forms, but all wrestle with the fundamental tension between the 
rights of creators and those of society at large.218 This friction has shaped 
international agreements such as the Berne Convention and the domestic 
copyright laws of different countries. In this Article, we examine the 
theoretical underpinnings of intellectual property law and how they apply 
to AI-generated translation systems. We argue that this analysis provides 
a useful frame of reference for examining the copyright issues of 
autonomous AI translation online. 
Three traditional, internationally-dominant frameworks exist for 
justifying or limiting intellectual property laws: the Utilitarian (or Law and 
Economics) theory; the Labor theory; and the Personality theory. Analysis 
of these traditional justifications, which all favor giving authors rights in 
their creative works, indicates that copyright law should protect authors 
from unauthorized online translation of these works.219 
However, two other, more recent justifications, lead to different 
conclusions. The first, the Distributive Justice Theory, stems from John 
Rawls’s theory of justice and challenges the three main frameworks as 
promoting insufficiently egalitarian outcomes.220 The second comes from 
Lior Zemer’s work, The Idea of Authorship in Copyright, in which he 
argues in favor of a more collective, or environmental, theory of copyright 
based on the notion that individual creative processes are shaped by 
surrounding culture, and therefore, the public at large should be a joint 
author for every copyrighted work.221 While we will briefly discuss these 
approaches to copyright law, it is important to note that they do not reflect 
existing legislation. 
The United States Constitution offers a prime example of the 
Utilitarian justification for intellectual property rights: Article I, Section 8 
grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”222 The idea 
is that the government creates intellectual property rights to provide 
creative individuals with a strong incentive to share the fruits of their labor 
with the public at large. “[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the 
engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”223 Absent such protections, free-riders, who had not 
invested any efforts, time, money, or creative work could pilfer the ideas 
of hard-working creative individuals who might be discouraged enough to 
renounce their imaginative pursuits at a loss to the general public.224 By 
granting artists, scientists, or writers exclusive rights over their works for 
a limited number of years, this approach balances providing creative 
individuals with benefits and furthering the public good. Currently, 
copyright in the United States typically lasts for the life of the author plus 
seventy years, with some variation in the case of works made for hire or 
those made anonymously, or pseudonymous.225 According to a Utilitarian 
theory of intellectual property, any regulation of AI online translation 
programs must function as an incentive to authors to share their works with 
the general public.  
The Labor theory of intellectual property, which has strongly 
influenced U.K. law, has Lockean underpinnings. In the Second Treatise 
on Government, John Locke argued that 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet 
every man has a “property” in his own “person.” This nobody has any 
right to but himself. The “labour” of his body and the “work” of his 
hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes 
out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed 
his labour with it, and joined it to something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property . . . For this “labour” being the 
unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a 
right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and 
as good left in common for others.226 
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Applied to copyright, this philosophy seeks to balance benefiting 
authors for their strenuous efforts and ensuring that the world at large is 
not left empty-handed in the process. In the case of automated online 
translation, this model suggests that authors’ consent is needed because 
authors have a property right in their labor. 
The Personality theory focuses more on the close connection 
between creators and their works. Under this framework, creators should 
own the property rights to their creations because these are a form of 
highly personal self-expression.227 Civil law countries such as France, 
Germany, and Italy favor the notion of inalienable moral rights, 
recognizing that works contain an expression of the personality of their 
authors.228 Viewed from this perspective, authors’ temporary monopoly on 
the use of their works stems not from the effort they expended or from a 
government incentive to produce more, but from the intimate, unique 
connection authors have with their works. It also means that “corporate 
entities and employers who hire third parties to create works for them do 
not qualify as authors” because they were not involved in the deeply 
individual process of creation.229 Following this approach, authors should 
be able to control if and how their works are translated using AI systems 
because the works are extensions of the authors as individuals.   
The Distributive Justice theory challenges the first three by positing 
that the law should set guidelines to ensure equitable distribution of 
societal resources.230 Relying on John Rawls’ philosophical “veil of 
ignorance,”231 this framework invites policymakers to devise intellectual 
property laws while imagining that they do not know what social class 
they belong to and what abilities they have.232 The idea is that the veil of 
ignorance guides policymakers toward more naturally fair results.233 
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Viewed this way, AI online translation programs should be limited by 
copyright law only to the extent that this does not cause gross inequalities 
of access to translated materials.   
Finally, the Collective model proposed by Lior Zemer runs counter 
to the notion that individual authors produce anything truly original in the 
sense that they are always inspired by what surrounds them.234 In The Idea 
of Authorship in Copyright, he wrote that “[e]very copyrighted entity 
represents the creative collectivity. It is a joint enterprise of both the 
individual author and the public.”235 According to this analysis, copyright 
law in its existing form is based on a flawed premise of originality, and the 
translation by AI systems of copyrighted material online should pose no 
authorship obstacles, particularly as the AI systems are routinely fed on 
contributions from a large pool of users.   
Current law espouses neither the Distributive Justice theory nor the 
Collective model; however, both frameworks are relevant to the ways in 
which existing copyright law is ill-equipped to deal with AI translations 
online. 
B. The Fair Use Doctrine and AI Translation Online 
Just as the invention of the printing press both facilitated the 
unauthorized copying of original works and improved public access to 
written materials, leading to the birth of copyright law, in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries a proliferation of new internet services has led 
to disputes stemming from the public’s unprecedented, widespread access 
to copyrighted material.236 The internet has allowed people to share vast 
quantities of material with one another around the world as never before, 
facilitating global communication.237 However, the rapid diffusion of 
content on the internet has also led to lawsuits as the tension between 
authors’ rights and the public domain takes on new forms.238 Time and 
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again, courts are asked to evaluate whether use of this material is allowed 
under the fair use doctrine, or whether it undermines the Founders’ goal 
of promoting “the progress of Science and useful Arts.”239    
Fair use is an affirmative defense to claims of direct copyright 
infringement; the United States Copyright Act of 1976 provides guidance 
on the American “fair use” doctrine, codified in section 107.240 It cites four 
relevant factors for examining whether a particular use of an original work 
is infringing or not: the purpose and character of the use (commercial or 
noncommercial, transformative or reproductive); the nature of the 
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the original work used; 
and the effect of such use upon the market, or potential market, of the 
original work.241 The preamble to the Act’s fair use section specifically 
cites “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship or research” as valid fair use 
purposes.242 Courts conducting a fair use analysis seek to determine 
“whether the copyright law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts would be better served by allowing the use than by 
preventing it.”243 A fair use defense “presupposes good faith and fair 
dealing, and one pertinent consideration is whether the user stands to profit 
from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”244 American courts have often viewed commercial uses 
of copyrighted material as presumptively unfair exploitations of authors’ 
monopoly privileges, while considering noncommercial uses of such 
material, especially in the educational context, as presumptively 
acceptable.245 
Judges have paid special attention to two of the four fair use factors: 
(1) whether a use is transformative in purpose, and (2) how a use affects 
the market, or potential market, for an original work.246 An analysis of 
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major United States copyright lawsuits indicates that, unlike other recent 
technological advances such as home video recorders, searchable web 
archives, or digital snippets of books, online translation programs fall 
outside the scope of the fair use doctrine in its current form. We argue that 
legislators should amend copyright law to carve out fair use exceptions to 
certain uses of machine translation online. 
C. Are AI Translation Services or Their Users Indirect Infringers? 
Are internet-related companies, such as Google, accountable for 
copyright infringement when they offer machine translation services 
online? Or are the users of these services at fault? Before internet use was 
widespread, courts still had to grapple with the ways in which 
technological advances could facilitate copyright infringement.247 In 
particular, courts have repeatedly addressed the issue of secondary 
liability, whether in the form of contributory infringement—meaning that 
a defendant did not directly engage in the infringing activity but somehow 
promoted or induced it—or vicarious liability—meaning that a defendant 
derived a direct financial benefit from infringing activity and had the 
ability to interrupt it, but did not.248 Secondary liability for copyright 
infringement assigns responsibility to those “who do not directly infringe 
copyright rights, but, who, as a matter of fairness or to serve some other 
overarching policy concern, should nonetheless be liable for the copyright 
infringement of others taking place within their ambit.”249 One oft-cited 
advantage of secondary liability is cost-effectiveness, as pursuing a single 
case against a secondary infringer is less expensive than pursuing many 
cases against direct, individual infringers.250 
In Sony v. Universal City Studios, for example, the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether manufacturers of home 
videotape recorders were guilty of contributory infringement, since many 
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owners of the videotape recorders were using them to copy and save 
television broadcasts, which are covered by copyright law.251 The Court 
held that since some users were infringing and others were not, the 
appropriate question to ask was whether the home videotape recorders 
were “capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses.”252 After 
determining that they were, the Court applied the fair use factors and noted 
that although commercial uses of copyrighted material are presumptively 
unfair, “[a] challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work 
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should 
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.”253 In this instance, the Court was not persuaded that 
some consumers’ use of the videotape recorders to copy television 
programs was harmful to the market, and since use of the technology for 
substantial non-infringing purposes was possible, the fair use doctrine 
should apply.254 
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun penned a vigorous dissent, objecting 
to the majority’s conclusion on the grounds that Congress had rejected a 
“private use” exemption to copyright infringement, observing that fair use 
does not apply “when a user reproduces an entire protected copyrightable 
work and uses it for its original purpose, with no added benefit to the 
public . . . [t]here is then no need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user 
with a fair use subsidy at the author’s expense.”255 
Changes in the way consumers could access music also raised new 
copyright problems.256 In 2001, the Ninth Circuit heard the case of A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.257 A&M Records, a company that recorded, 
distributed, and sold music, had sued Napster for contributory and 
vicarious copyright infringement.258 Napster was a start-up business that 
facilitated peer-to-peer file sharing, allowing its users to search for other 
users’ files through a centralized index (a kind of electronic library card 
catalog) before copying and saving them on their own computers.259 Since 
Napster itself was not doing the file copying, and was merely providing 
                                                     
 251. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422–23, 434–42 (1984). 
 252. Id. at 442. 
 253. Id. at 451. 
 254. Id. at 455. 
 255. Id. at 472, 480. 
 256. See also Joshua P. Binder, The Future of Streaming Technology After Grokster, L.A. L., 
Dec. 2005, at 13 (noting that “several technological changes have converged to cause a sea change in 
the way musical recordings can be delivered to consumers”). See generally Grossman, supra note 249 
(discussing the challenges of copyright enforcement for online service providers). 
 257. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 258. Id. at 1010–11. 
 259. Id. at 1011. 
148 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:99 
users with the centralized index and allowing them to connect with one 
another, the court needed to address the issue of secondary liability.260 
On the question of contributory infringement, the court examined 
whether Napster knew or had reason to know of acts of infringement by 
its users and whether it was materially contributing to such infringement; 
because Napster was aware of user downloads of copyrighted music files 
and because it facilitated such downloads through its centralized index, the 
court found Napster was a contributory infringer.261 On the issue of 
vicarious liability for infringement, the court asked whether Napster had 
the ability to supervise its users and whether it benefited financially from 
their infringement.262 Here, too, the court reasoned against Napster, 
finding that it was vicariously liable for infringement because it was 
materially benefiting from an infringement that it could have prevented.263 
As a result of this lawsuit, Napster was effectively out of business,264 but 
its demise led to the rise of music industry-supported commercial services 
such as iTunes, which capitalize on user demand for single songs rather 
than entire albums without infringing on artists’ copyrights.265 
In 2005, the Supreme Court heard another music industry case: 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.266 Grokster was a 
company that marketed itself as a successor to Napster, but it operated 
without a centralized server; individual users of the service contacted each 
other regarding what content they were willing to share using Grokster’s 
Gnutella technology.267 The Court was not impressed, holding that “one 
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.”268 Whereas in the Sony case, the Court could not attribute specific 
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knowledge of infringement to Sony and was unwilling to impute such 
knowledge to the company; in Grokster, the defendant company’s own 
statements about its potential uses were evidence of vicarious 
infringement.269 
Collectively, these cases illustrate the attention United States courts 
have paid not only to instances of direct copyright infringement, but also 
to more indirect circumventions of the spirit of the law, which are often 
made easier by emerging technologies. By implication, these cases raise 
the following questions: Are users who paste copyrighted material into 
machine translation programs and click the translate button infringers? Or 
is the provider of these services the infringer? In short, are online machine 
translation programs like Napster and Grokster? We think the parallels are 
strong, but as we discuss further in this Article, amendments to copyright 
law and the fair use doctrine could easily—and should—address the 
problems of copyright infringement in AI online translation to provide a 
more desirable outcome. 
D. Purpose and Character: Transformative Use, Google Books and 
HathiTrust 
The first fair use factor, which examines the “purpose and character” 
of a use, invites courts to consider whether a use “adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character” and does “not substitute for 
the original use of the work.”270 An examination of United States case law 
indicates that online translation does not meet this definition of 
transformative.271 
In 2004, Google started developing the Google Books Library 
Project.272 Its goal was to scan the book collections of major libraries and 
make the digitized information available to both the libraries and to the 
general public, which would have access to randomized portions of the 
books via Google’s search engine.273 Under United States copyright law, 
copyright holders—such as the authors or publishers of books—have the 
exclusive right (for a limited time) to make and sell copies of their works, 
to create derivative works, and to perform or display their works 
publicly.274 Although many of the works it was scanning were still in 
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copyright, Google did not contact any authors or publishers as part of the 
Google Books Library Project. In 2005, the writers’ advocacy group The 
Authors Guild accused Google of committing large-scale copyright 
infringement.275 
Following two Second Circuit court decisions in favor of Google and 
the United States Supreme Court’s denial of the Authors Guild’s petition 
for certiorari, Google was free to pursue its Library Project under the fair 
use doctrine’s four factors.276 Ultimately, the courts held that the Google 
Books Library Project offered a transformative use of copyrighted works 
that did not usurp authors’ rights to produce derivative works and did not 
significantly affect the potential market for the authors’ works.277 The 
Second Circuit held that use of digital copies to provide a search function 
“augments public knowledge by making available information about 
Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a substantial substitute 
for matter protected by the Plaintiffs’ copyright interests in the original 
works or derivatives of them.”278 The same was found true of Google’s 
“snippet” function, which made small sections of original text visible.279 
Thus, the use of copyrighted material was transformative in that its 
purpose did not directly mirror that of the original authors. This analysis 
would appear to not apply to online translation services, which provide 
users with derivative works—translations—that are a substantial 
substitute for authors’ copyright interests in their original works. 
In a related case, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, authors and 
various authors’ associations brought suit against an organization called 
HathiTrust.280 Founded by a group of research universities to house digital 
copies of their libraries, which they wanted to share with one another, 
HathiTrust’s Digital Library (HDL) was a repository of “digital copies of 
more than ten million works, published over many centuries, written in a 
multitude of languages, covering almost every subject imaginable.”281 The 
plaintiffs alleged that HathiTrust’s digitalization of copyrighted works 
without author permission, and their conversion of works into formats for 
print-disabled individuals, were violations of the Copyright Act.282 The 
court came down on the side of fair use, guided principally by the fact that 
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the service did not add into circulation entire works; it merely allowed 
users to conduct “word searches” to locate specific phrases and page 
numbers in digitized books.283 Thus, scanning the full works did not 
amount to taking an excessive portion of the copyrighted works. Further, 
the authors would not suffer economic injury because the service did not 
serve as a substitute for their original works. 
In its analysis, however, the court made several relevant comments 
that suggest translations should be treated differently. To start, in its 
definition of what constitutes transformative use of a copyrighted work, 
the court noted that “[a] use is transformative if it does something more 
than repackage or republish the original copyrighted work.”284 The court 
disputed the notion that the use of digital copies to facilitate access for 
print-disabled persons was transformative, noting that: 
[A] transformative use adds something new to the copyrighted work 
and does not merely supersede the purposes of the original creation . 
. . . By making copyrighted works available in formats accessible to 
the disabled, the HDL enables a larger audience to read those works, 
but the underlying purpose of the HDL’s use is the same as the 
author’s original purpose. Indeed, when the HDL recasts copyrighted 
works into new formats to be read by the disabled, it appears, at first 
glance, to be creating derivative works over which the author 
ordinarily maintains control. As previously noted, paradigmatic 
examples of derivative works include translations of the original into 
a different language, or adaptations of the original into different 
forms or media . . . . It is true that, oftentimes, the print-disabled 
audience has no means of obtaining access to the copyrighted works 
included in the HDL. But, similarly, the non-English speaking 
audience cannot gain access to untranslated books written in English 
and an unauthorized translation is not transformative simply because 
it enables a new audience to read a work.285  
While the court held that providing access to the print-disabled was 
not a transformative fair use of copyrighted material, it found that such a 
use was nevertheless a valid purpose supported by Supreme Court 
decisions and statements from Congress, which carved out special 
exceptions to copyright law to benefit the disabled. This suggests that, 
absent congressional amendments to the Copyright Act, an automated 
online translation of a copyrighted work would not be considered 
transformative under the first fair use factor (purpose). The fact that it 
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enables a larger audience to read the work is insufficient to satisfy this 
branch of the fair use doctrine. 
E. Commercial Impact of Use 
Under the fourth fair use factor, United States courts have also 
addressed the commercial impact of unauthorized translations by 
examining “whether, and to what extent, the unlicensed use harms the 
existing or future market for the copyright owner’s original work.”286 In 
evaluating this factor, courts “consider whether the use is hurting the 
current market for the original work (for example, by displacing sales of 
the original) and/or whether the use could cause substantial harm if it were 
to become widespread.”287 Because unauthorized translations compete 
with authorized translations and because poor quality translations may 
harm an author’s moral rights, online translation programs are unlikely to 
meet the test for fair use under the fourth factor. 
United States courts have had occasion to examine fair use defenses 
to unlicensed translations, looking at the impact they have on the market 
for authors’ works. For example, in 1987, in Radji v. Khakbaz, a dispute 
concerning the unauthorized translation of excerpts of an author’s work 
published in an Iranian newspaper—after the same excerpts had appeared 
with the author’s permission in a British newspaper—a district court judge 
in the District of Columbia held that the fair use defense did not apply, 
largely because “[d]efendants’ reprinting of the 80 days of diary entries in 
a commercial publication was presumably intended to boost sales and thus 
was for commercial rather than non-profit educational purposes.”288 
In 1999, in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, 
Inc., a Japanese publisher of financial, business, and industry news 
brought a copyright and trademark infringement action against a United 
States company and its officers based on the company’s sale of roughly 
translated “abstracts” of the publisher’s news articles.289 The court held 
that the defendant was guilty of infringement because the company’s news 
abstracts precisely replicated the original publisher’s structure and 
organization of facts.290 
The Comline abstracts appear to be direct, if not word-for-word, 
translations of the Nikkei articles, edited only for clarity. The average 
Comline abstract uses about two-thirds of the protectible material in 
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the corresponding Nikkei article. The abstracts track the information 
in the articles sentence by sentence, in sequence; only occasionally 
do the abstracts combine two Nikkei sentences, divide a sentence, or 
rearrange the facts among different sentences. Comline adopts, by 
and large, the exact same structure and organization of the facts 
reported by Nikkei.291 
Though careful to highlight that facts are not copyrightable, the court 
here focused on the sale of abstracts that were essentially replicas of 
copyrighted news articles, translated quickly by human employees.292 The 
actions taken by the defendants in both of these cases, except for paying 
at least some attention to quality and abstracting the content, are highly 
similar in their commercial nature to those of automated translating 
systems.293 Though automated translation providers may not directly 
charge users for translations, they are for-profit companies that are able to 
sell advertising and user data, making their use of authors’ works 
commercial. 
F. The Fair Use Doctrine Does Not Cover AI Translation—But Maybe It 
Should, Sometimes 
 
AI translation online presents an unusual set of copyright issues that 
United States courts have not yet directly addressed. However, based on 
case law focused on other technological innovations, it appears that the 
current fair use doctrine would not apply to the machine translation of 
copyrighted material online. These examples illustrate tensions similar to 
those that arise with the proliferation of translation tools online. Authors 
have the right to make copies and create derivative versions of their works, 
and according to the Berne Convention, this means they have the “right to 
translate” their works; yet automated online translation systems do not 
seek permission from authors to translate their works.294 Further, while 
Sony home video recorders faithfully reproduced original television 
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content and Napster facilitated the sharing of existing songs, translation 
services often produce distorted, poor quality translations of original 
works which may harm authors’ reputations.295 Like Sony, translation 
services could argue that they merely provide users with a tool, similar to 
a video recorder or a camera, and that they cannot be held responsible for 
any infringing uses of the tool. However, end-users of these services are 
accessing complete original works in unauthorized derivative form, and 
such use is inherently infringing, rather than substantially non-infringing, 
and services such as Google Translate are fully aware of the fact because 
they explicitly offer to translate entire pages of web content.296 In this 
sense, translation services closely resemble Napster or Grokster, as they 
know of infringing uses of their platforms, encourage rather than limit 
them and also benefit financially from them. 
The way the HathiTrust court applied the fourth fair use factor, 
which looks at the market impact of a contested use of a copyrighted work, 
also indicates that translations could be protected in a way that the page 
numbers and keyword searches of Google Books are not because 
translation services may undermine authors’ reliance on quality 
translations for their works. The HathiTrust court held that the fair use 
“doctrine is generally subject to an important proviso: A fair use must not 
excessively damage the market for the original by providing the public 
with a substitute for that original work.”297 For example, a book review 
that quotes from a book is acceptable as fair use both because it is not a 
substantial portion of the work in question and because—even if the 
review is negative and discourages readers from buying the book, causing 
economic harm to the author—the review is not a substitute for the 
book.298 Fair use also allows an internet search engine to “display low-
resolution versions of copyrighted images in order to direct the user to the 
website where the original could be found.”299 Translations of web pages 
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or articles are often not mere quotes or the equivalent of low-resolution 
thumbnails, but they are the entirety of a copyrighted work,300 and reading 
such a translation may substitute a search for the original work or an 
authorized translation of it—especially as the translation services do not 
direct users to alternate sources with better-quality translations. 
Finally, the HathiTrust court cited the importance of mass download 
prevention systems when it noted that even where the libraries involved in 
the case permitted works to be read online, they made efforts to ensure that 
“inappropriate levels of access” did not take place.301 Currently, no such 
barriers prevent automated services from translating copyrighted material 
online. 
However, legislators could easily change this by carving out a special 
set of fair use factors that apply to AI translation online. These could 
specify that automated translation of certain material on the web is non-
infringing even when it covers the entire protected copyrightable work. 
For instance, fair use could be extended to the automated translation of 
“snippets” of text on the web, sufficient to get the gist of content without 
reproducing it entirely. This approach would mirror that of the Second 
Circuit in the Google Books Library Project, which focused on the amount 
and substantiality of copyrighted works being made available to internet 
users.302 It would allow the de minimis translation of copyrighted material 
useful to people conducting research online while prohibiting the 
wholesale translation of lengthy news articles without the publishers’ 
consent. Fair use could also consider damage to the markets for an original 
work and for a translation of it, looking at the impact of an automated 
translation on an author’s ability to profit from his work as well as any 
reputational damage arising from a poor translation, echoing the concerns 
of Radji and Nihon.303 In many instances, where the amount of text 
translated is minimal and for private use, AI web translations would easily 
clear this hurdle. 
Challenges to these explicit limitations are likely to arise from those 
who argue that copyright law in general has grown too expansive, at the 
expense of broad public access to knowledge.304 Yet failure to protect 
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authors’ rights can also diminish public access by discouraging creators 
from sharing their works in the first place.305 An analysis of the copyright 
issues of translation cannot ignore that the companies providing 
translation on the web are for-profit multinationals. While international 
copyright law creates exceptions for educational or research purposes, 
these special cases do not extend to the unauthorized use of copyrighted 
material for financial gain.306 
Lawmakers should act to clarify which uses of AI online translation 
qualify as fair use to preserve copyright law while also facilitating the 
public’s access to culture and knowledge. 
G. Comparative Perspective: Ideas from Abroad 
While the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France 
all recognize copyright law and grant authors limited monopolies over 
their works, each of these jurisdictions also carves out exceptions, creating 
limited circumstances under which use of an author’s material without 
permission does not constitute copyright infringement.307 “From its 
beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant 
changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of 
copying equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original need 
for copyright protection.”308 Because AI translation platforms are global, 
the theoretical justifications for copyright law in different countries 
provide an important means for analyzing this new technological 
development and its creation of copyright disputes. 
1. Copyright in the United Kingdom, Canada, and France 
In its emphasis on protecting the property rights of original works 
produced by creative labor, the United Kingdom “approach fits fairly 
neatly with John Locke’s labour theory as a justification of property 
rights.”309 The United Kingdom’s Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 protects “(a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, (b) 
sound recordings, films [or broadcasts], and (c) the typographical 
arrangement of published editions” and grants all authors the right of 
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reproduction or the right to control how and when copies of their works 
are made.310 Depending on the type of work at issue, the UK also grants 
authors the distribution right, the rental right, the public performance right, 
the communication right, and the adaptation right.311 
Like the United States, the United Kingdom allows some exceptions 
to copyright, known as “fair dealing” exceptions. These, however, are 
more limited than their United States counterparts.312 Fair dealing allows 
some use of copyrighted material for purposes of non-commercial research 
or study, criticism and review, or news reporting.313 To use this defense, 
the claimed infringer must show not only that the copying falls into one of 
these three categories, but also that it is “fair” and often, that it contains 
sufficient acknowledgement for the original author.314 Factors when 
considering the “fairness” of the copying can include the quantity of the 
work taken, the infringer’s motives, and how the infringement will affect 
the author’s returns for the copyrighted work.315 In 2014, the United 
Kingdom introduced a new fair dealing exception, allowing some text and 
data mining as long as these were done for non-commercial research 
purposes.316 Copyright law in the United Kingdom typically lasts for “70 
years from the end of the calendar year in which the last remaining author 
of the work dies.”317 
Canadian copyright law was passed with the Copyright Act of 
Canada in 1921 and amended in 1988, 1997, and 2012.318 The Act covers 
“every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work,” but also 
performances, sound recordings and communication signals,319 and gives 
authors copyright —which covers the right to “produce, reproduce, 
perform or publish any translation of the work”320—moral rights and 
“neighbouring” rights. Moral rights include attribution, integrity, and 
association, allowing authors to have some control over what their work is 
associated with, while neighbouring rights pertain to the performance, 
transmission, and reproduction of creative works and are especially 
relevant in the music industry.321 Fair dealing exceptions cover “research, 
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private study, education, parody or satire,” “criticism and review,” and 
“news reporting.”322 There is also an exception for “non-commercial user-
generated content,” which allows some use of materials available to the 
public subject to the following exceptions: 
(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or 
other subject-matter is done solely for non-commercial purposes; 
(b) the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the author, 
performer, maker or broadcaster — of the existing work or other 
subject-matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the 
circumstances to do so; 
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing 
work or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may be, was 
not infringing copyright; and 
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or 
other subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect, 
financial or otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of 
the existing work or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on an 
existing or potential market for it, including that the new work or 
other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one.323 
Canada has two official languages, English and French, and the 
Official Languages Act requires the federal government to provide 
services to citizens in both languages.324 Canada is also a Crown copyright 
country, meaning special copyright rules cover the distribution of state-
produced materials.325 Copyright in Canada lasts for the lifetime of an 
author plus fifty years.326 
The first article of the French Intellectual Property Code is 
unambiguous in emphasis: it states that “[l]’auteur d’une oeuvre de 
l’esprit” (the author of a work of the spirit) by virtue of its creation alone, 
enjoys an exclusive property right in the work.327 French droit d’auteur 
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(author’s rights) protects any original work, expressed in any form; thus, 
unlike the United States and UK, France does not require the work to be 
recorded in a tangible medium of expression, and covers, for example, 
original choreography.328 The Code defines two distinct sets of rights for 
authors: droits patrimoniaux (proprietary rights) and droits moraux (moral 
rights).329 Once an author’s work has been published, French law carves 
out limited exceptions for non-infringing uses of the work, ranging from 
private family performances to research, press critiques, diffusion of 
current news, and parody, among others.330 Copyright in France lasts for 
an author’s lifetime plus seventy years,331 with some variation for 
posthumous works or those by authors who died in battle defending 
France.332 
In each of these jurisdictions, copyright law strives to protect 
authors’ rights while recognizing that there are limited circumstances in 
which the public’s use of original material should not be considered 
infringing. Technological advances often pose legal challenges as 
different jurisdictions seek to maintain this balance.333 
2. Web Innovation and Copyright Law Outside the United States 
An examination of internet copyright issues from other jurisdictions 
suggests that there, too, online translation would likely fall outside the 
parameters of fair dealing or other exceptions to infringement. In the 
United Kingdom and Canada, problems arise under a fair dealing analysis 
because the non-commercial purpose of the translation would not be 
satisfied: the companies providing the translations are commercial 
enterprises.334 In addition, the amount of material such programs copy is 
currently unlimited, and while it is unclear how translation could affect the 
market for individual authors’ works, it could conceivably harm the 
market for good-quality translations, which would violate fair dealing 
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principles.335 Further, unlike internet service providers, which the 
Supreme Court of Canada held are not users under the country’s Copyright 
Act336 (and therefore do not have to pay royalties for illegally downloaded 
music), translation programs would likely fall under sections 2.4(1) and 
2.4(1.1) of the Act, which cover “communication to the public by 
telecommunication” and provide that “communication of a work or other 
subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it 
available to the public by telecommunication in a way that allows a 
member of the public to have access to it from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by that member of the public.”337 In France, which 
places significant emphasis on moral rights, translations online may face 
barriers not only for their infringement on the rights of reproduction and 
translation but also because they deprive authors of the right to preserve 
the integrity of their works.338 
Many European Union publishers have voiced dissatisfaction with 
the relative lack of regulation of major search engines, and “[s]ome E.U. 
member states have responded . . . by implementing legislation that 
requires search engines to pay a tax to publishers for displaying these 
excerpts on their search results page.”339 Spain, for instance, passed 
legislation in 2015 requiring Google to pay publishers a tax if it wanted to 
provide links to the publishers’ content.340 Writing in the Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal, Christopher Gagne argued 
that such a move would help counteract the exploitation by search engine 
powerhouses of publishers’ works for commercial gain, which tends to 
“[eliminate] fair competition within the industry, and [remove] the 
incentive to innovate among publishers.”341 By creating a tax on the 
publication of article content, Gagne suggested that legislation, such as 
that introduced in Spain, would “eliminate search engines’ ability to 
leverage their dominant position within the digital market against 
publishers’ rights to compensation for reproduction of their original 
works.”342 
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The Spanish legislation is also indicative, however, of a generalized 
European distrust of the monopoly Google, in particular, has established 
online, and a resistance to the notion that because web aggregators may 
provide additional access to original content, they should be immune from 
claims of copyright infringement.343 We argue that copyright protection 
should not “prevent the normal functioning and the development of new 
technologies, but . . . it is necessary to ensure an adequate protection of 
copyright in the information society. Technological development allows, 
in fact, faster and easier reproduction of works, for which reason 
protection of copyright must adapt to this technological development.”344 
Further, as the internet assumes an ever-more-dominant role in the way 
people communicate with one another, European countries have 
questioned the power of companies facilitating such communication, 
expressing concerns that these large firms have “so far slipped through the 
regulatory net, operating without burdens and without regulation.”345 
Numerous European countries reacted unfavorably to the 2005 
Google Books ruling in the United States,346 and it is unlikely that a similar 
result would have emerged in the European Union.347 In 2009, French 
publishing group La Martinière and others similarly situated won a lawsuit 
against Google for copyright infringement, after Google included books 
from the publishing group in its Google Books Library Project without 
permission.348 
Specifically, La Martinière alleged a violation of its right of 
reproduction, copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair 
competition.349 The French publishers’ union (Syndicat national de 
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l’édition) and the Société des gens de lettres (SGDLF), a writers’ 
association founded in 1838 by Honoré de Balzac, Victor Hugo, 
Alexandre Dumas and George Sand, had joined the lawsuit in support of 
La Martinière.350 The French court’s finding of copyright infringement 
prevented Google from including French works that were still in copyright 
in its Books project, although it was able to draw on works for which the 
copyright had expired.351 Though Google initially appealed the ruling, in 
2011 it signed an agreement with La Martinière covering out-of-print 
editions, and this deal ended the legal dispute between the companies.352 
Such agreements appear to be a common compromise: in 2013, Google 
and French government officials struck a deal that would quash proposed 
legislation similar to the Spanish tax, on the condition that Google support 
the digitization of French publications through major financial 
investments.353 
In Europe, as in the United States, courts continue to grapple with 
the best way to balance copyright protection with technological and—in 
particular—internet innovation. In 2016, as part of its proposed update of 
European Union copyright rules, the European Commission suggested a 
new copyright exception that would allow research organizations to use 
text and data mining tools to analyze digital content that has been lawfully 
acquired or accessed.354 This suggests that any fair use-type exceptions to 
translation online may be palatable to European courts only in a non-
commercial, research-driven setting. Because AI online translation 
platforms reach a global audience, United States lawmakers must work 
with their counterparts in Canada, Europe, and around the world in closing 
the gaps of today’s copyright law, which must be updated to reflect new 
technological advances. 
VI. CRAFTING A MORE BALANCED SOLUTION 
Can copyright law address the unusual problems posed by AI 
translation online? Online translation services continue to suffer from 
inherent issues as to quality and bias—issues which can ultimately deform 
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an author’s original work. In addition, the proliferation of cheap, poor-
quality translations can effectively harm or destroy the market for the 
underlying work itself, as well as for good translations in general.355 
On the other hand, online translations—especially into languages 
that are not widely spoken—can bring news and ideas to places that would 
never otherwise have access to them. In addition to broadening people’s 
linguistic horizons, these advanced technological tools have a place in the 
public sphere where precision and style are of secondary importance and 
what really matters is getting a taste of another culture.356 There is a market 
for AI translation, and it would be short-sighted to ignore and create 
meaningless legal hurdles for users. 
This Article advocates greater balance to minimize the harms of AI 
translation services while maximizing their benefits. In its current form, 
the copyright regime cannot withstand the rapid developments of AI and 
online machine translation tools. Given the wide-scale use of Google 
Translate and its kin, enforcing existing copyright restrictions without 
making any adjustments would be a futile and inefficient means of 
balancing the public and private interests at the heart of intellectual 
property law justifications, whichever justification one adopts. We cannot 
stop technological progress; nor should we try. 
Instead, it is time to take practical measures by combining legal and 
digital tools to address the copyright problems of AI translation online. 
The ultimate goal should be to continue promoting authors’ rights while 
enabling access to knowledge and to cultural assets. New solutions must 
function across jurisdictions and stand the test of time and evolving 
technology.357 
Currently, in the absence of rules specifically addressing online 
translation, the law ignores the copyright violations it causes. Instead, the 
law favors the interests of big companies such as Google and Microsoft, 
which have almost unlimited access to copyrighted materials to mine for 
profit by engaging with users and selling related advertising.358 Although 
consumers can use online translation services without pulling out their 
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wallets, they are not receiving a free product: they (we) are paying with 
their (our) data. In 2017, for example, news reports indicated that 
Translate.com, which provides a free machine translation service powered 
by Microsoft Translator, had indexed a large volume of highly sensitive 
material its users had been translating, from termination letters to a global 
bank’s staff performance report.359 The company’s Terms & Conditions 
stated that Translate.com could not and did not “guarantee that any 
information provided to [them] by you will not become public under any 
circumstances.”360 It further provided that “[y]ou should appreciate that all 
information submitted on the website might potentially be publicly 
accessible.”361 
In the next sub-section, we will describe our new proposed 
framework. We argue for balance between the conflicting goals at issue 
and suggest that balance is best achieved with a combination of digital and 
legal tools. We need to make more room for authors’ rights without 
shutting down AI translation programs, which is possible by setting limits 
on the amount and type of content that may be translated automatically 
online and by requiring software designers to adopt a “fair use by design” 
approach to their AI translation systems that implements legal 
guidelines.362 
Our framework is based on several conclusions drawn from the 
above discussions. 
First, the law requires greater consideration for authors’ rights in 
translations of their works—and in quality translations in general—but not 
at the expense of web-based cross-cultural exchange in the process. 
Second, legislators should generally allow the free use of AI translation 
programs, but clearly delineate the amount and type of content that may 
be translated automatically online and allow authors to opt out of having 
their webpages available for automatic machine translation. Third, AI 
translation platforms should adhere to fair use guidelines by design. 
Finally, policymakers should set guidelines establishing the reach of the 
fair use doctrine in AI translation, stating explicitly what constitutes an 
infringement, and WIPO should join this effort, devising its own norms in 
collaboration with policy makers internationally to ensure the rules’ global 
                                                     
 359. Florian Faes, Translate.com Exposes Highly Sensitive Information in Massive Privacy 
Breach, SLATOR (Sept. 7, 2017), https://slator.com/technology/translate-com-exposes-highly-
sensitive-information-massive-privacy-breach [https://perma.cc/4J6Q-72CP]. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1085 (2017) (arguing 
that “for fair use to serve its role in the twenty-first century, the checks that it intends to create on the 
rights of authors must also be embedded in the design of online systems”). 
2019] From the Myth of Babel 165 
applicability. By reducing uncertainty, this framework will protect all of 
the interests at the core of intellectual property law. 
A. First Conclusion: It’s Time for New Fair Use Guidelines and Digital 
Traffic Lights 
The law should respect the rights of authors to control use of their 
works—and not give large multinational corporations a free pass to use 
any work which is accessible to the public—but it should accomplish this 
aim without impeding technological developments. As a first step, 
lawmakers should delineate what amount and, under what circumstances, 
AI translation constitutes fair use. 
In his 2007 article examining the copyright issues of translation, Eric 
Ketzan discussed creating an affirmative “you may translate” metatag, 
which translation providers could offer authors as an explicit license.363 
Metatags are behind-the-scenes HTML code on webpages. Although they 
would not entirely prevent unauthorized translation from occurring,364 
they would promote a greater awareness of copyright on behalf of 
consumers and give authors more options without entirely restricting 
digital innovation. Indeed, many authors, keen on reaching new readers 
around the globe and gaining renown, may gladly acquiesce to the 
automatic translation of their content; the key is that their consent would 
be voluntary, not an imposition by a for-profit company. If the law 
required online translation service providers to use digital traffic lights, 
giving authors the ability to permit or reject translations, authors and 
service providers could work together: authors might actually be involved 
in translating their works and could receive compensation for them. The 
more in demand an author’s works in different languages, the more the 
author could profit from partnering with an AI translation service provider. 
Just as Napster and Grokster paved the way for iTunes by revealing 
consumer demand for music online,365 so could translation programs 
evolve in a direction that builds on people’s desire to communicate without 
infringing copyright law. 
We do not think metatags usage is the only viable approach, but the 
underlying idea has merit: by legally requiring software developers to give 
authors more choices concerning the automatic translation of their works 
online, both authors and service suppliers could profit from translations in 
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the global marketplace.366 Policymakers should establish new fair use 
guidelines for AI translations. 
B. Second Conclusion: AI Translation Programs Should Promote Fair 
Use by Design367 
In his book Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control the Design of 
New Technologies, Woodrow Hartzog persuasively discussed the 
importance of product design in shaping behavior and protecting privacy: 
“Through signals, design helps define our relationships and our risk 
calculus when dealing with others. Design affects our expectations about 
how things work and the context within which we are acting.”368 In a 
similar vein, policymakers have suggested that privacy concerns should be 
addressed at the outset of product design, rather than post hoc once 
problems emerge.369 In other words, “privacy initiatives should be 
‘proactive, not reactive, preventative, not remedial.’”370 
Analogously, AI translation programs should use software design 
that facilitates compliance with fair use of copyrighted material through 
appropriate signaling, rather than encouraging copyright violations. 
Designers of these programs and their stakeholders “must begin with 
oversight and accountability in mind”371 as this will encourage authors to 
participate in, rather than avoid, content-sharing platforms online. Users, 
meanwhile, will still be able to make de minimis use of translated 
copyrighted material without facing unreasonable hurdles. 
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C. Third Conclusion: We Need WIPO and International Guidelines 
The internet is intrinsically global in nature, AI translation tools are 
used worldwide, and international norms governing translations state that 
they are derivative works whose copyright lies with the original author. 
Therefore, to be effective, any solution to the issues raised must involve 
WIPO. International lawmakers must consult with one another, examining 
the ways in which different jurisdictions have handled conflicts between 
new web-based technology online and copyright law and working together 
to set new guidelines for AI translations. 
This framework aims to support the public’s right to communicate 
freely and engage with others on the web while protecting the rights of 
authors to profit from their original creative endeavors for a limited time. 
To the extent that we propose restrictions on the automatic translation of 
material, we do so also to emphasize the value of cultural diversity in all 
its nuances, which machines can never understand, let alone accurately 
replicate. Taken to extremes, copyright law can be a burdensome 
restriction on creativity and speech, but there is no need to seek an extreme 
solution here, and authors should not be forced to abandon all rights on the 
internet. Further, when we allow ourselves to be dazzled by AI translation 
technology, we not only ignore copyright, but we also lose sight of its 
inaccuracies and biases. In short, by paying a little more attention to these 
problems, lawmakers could readily solve them. 
VII. EPILOGUE 
The increased availability of translation services online has made it 
necessary for copyright law to address the unique issues such services raise 
concerning authors’ moral rights and rights of reproduction and 
translation, balanced against the desirable goal of providing people 
worldwide with access to culture and ideas. Translation provides a useful 
linguistic tool in contexts that do not require perfect fluency, but its 
unrestrained use propagates biased language, violates authors’ rights, and 
damages the market for high-quality translations (to the detriment of 
authors, translators and the general public). Therefore, the law should 
impose limits on the type and amount of material which for-profit 
companies may translate automatically online, amending the fair use 
doctrine to reference AI translations explicitly. It should also demand that 
AI translation software programmers implement fair use by design, in 
addition to privacy by design. The internet is global and so are languages; 
thus, WIPO should establish clear international guidelines concerning 
machine translation. 
As we increasingly come to rely upon AI translation platforms, we 
should not lose sight of their weaknesses. Though certain readings of the 
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story of Babel may invite us to mourn the loss of a single language, others 
recognize that good translations celebrate global difference and depend 
upon the considerable linguistic dexterity, cultural fluency, and creative 
effort of translators. 
 
